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Lessons of Empire

On September 26-27, 2003, the Council sponsored a conference at New York University entitled, "Lessons of Empire." Participants focused on whether currently prevalent "empire talk" provides a useful set of concepts for analyzing contemporary US economic, cultural, political and military power. Accounts of particular historical cases or issues were presented in a series of panels organized to encourage comparative assessments. The SSRC is collaborating with The New Press to publish a volume based on the conference. Edited by SSRC President Craig Calhoun, Council Board member Fred Cooper and Program Director Kevin Moore, Lessons of Empire *will be the fifth volume in the SSRC/New Press series "After September 11." Below we present three of the essays written for the conference, selected around the theme of the limits of imperial power. We also include a number of quotations from conference papers that deal with related lessons of empire.*

Ilkka Uimonen/Magnum

Modernizing Colonialism and the Limits of Empire

By Frederick Cooper

A few years ago, with-it scholars were claiming that the nation-state was dying and that new forms of global connections would shape the world order. Now the state is back, and in one instance in a form so powerful that public intellectuals call it an empire. Earnest liberals lamented the imperial arrogance of the United States government, but then some feisty conservatives seized the terrain and asserted that indeed the US was an empire and that its unembarrassed exercise of state power would be good for the *(continued on page 2)*

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world as a whole.[1]

The argument that the nation-state is withering away was just as wrong on September 10, 2001, as it is today, and what is particularly striking—and in some ways ominous—about the way the US projects its power is that it is *not* like an empire. The relationship between territorially bounded institutions and trans-territorial linkages has long been a shifting one, and the current phase of history is no exception to this pattern. But the examination of *how* it is shifting in this conjuncture is not promoted by arguments that dissolve the problem, either by proclaiming the death of the state or dominance of one state.

Empire is being used more as a metaphor than as a category that designates a particular form of polity. But some of the most crucial questions we face are about the structures through which power is exercised in an asymmetrical world order, about the institutions that can conjugate territorial and deterritorialized processes, about the forms of shared sovereignty that the European Union and other units of international cooperation entail, and about the governance of multicultural polities. The virtue of thinking about empire historically is that it cuts the nation-state down to size. We need not see history as a succession of coherent epochs: from empire to nation to post-national globality. Recognizing the continuing importance of empires well into the twentieth century and the importance of political movements that sought to change as well as replace empires points to a more general issue of continued relevance: the *range* of possibilities for exercising power. In past as in future, communities may be imagined, but not all imaginings are national ones.[2]

Empires often provided a context for more or less peaceful coexistence of ethnic or religious groups. But if they were cosmpolitan and sometimes tolerant, this is partly because they were not at all democratic.

Craig Calhoun
New York University and
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Recent attempts to rethink contemporary imperialism on more post-modern and post-colonial lines, e.g., in terms of "network hegemony" and transnational corporate collusion, should not obscure the changing realities of US hegemony, especially after the end of the Cold War.

K. S. Jomo
University of Malaya

A useful beginning in examining the specificities of intrusive, sovereignty-compromising, transformative political forms is to distinguish among the imperial, the hegemonic, and the colonial.[3] Yet those distinctions say both too much and too little, not enough to distinguish the vast differences in process and effect within each, too much to understand the ambiguity and the interplay among them. If one grants that the US position on Iraq is not about empire in the formal sense—asserting long-term sovereignty over Iraq—and therefore is either hegemonic or imperial but not colonial, one quickly arrives at a problem that is indeed quite colonial. Take the following catalogue from a recent op-ed piece in *The New York Times*: Iraq faces

> at least a decade's worth of reconstruction and improvements. This will include rebuilding ports, farms, roads, telecommunications systems, power plants, hospitals and water systems, as well as introducing a medical benefit plan, a national pension scheme, and new laws for foreign investment and intellectual property rights. The country needs a revised criminal code and judiciary system, a new tax code and collection system, and an electoral voting system with appropriate technology.... The total bill is likely to be at least $200 billion over a decade.[4]

[1]The shift is embodied in the contrasting arguments of two books called *Empire*, one by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), which dissolves politics into amorphous but all-powerful global networks, and another by Niall Ferguson (London: Alan Lane, 2002), which concludes with a plea for the United States to take up the mantle of the British empire, an argument which contradicts his relatively critical, sometimes cynical, view of the empire that actually existed.

[2]As Craig Calhoun has argued, the sense of community comes from thinking and debating about constitutions, institutions, and norms—not just from prior sentiments—which makes all the more important an effort to address issues of shared and compromised sovereignty and non-national institutions. "Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere," *Public Culture* 14 (2002): 147-71.

[3]The papers presented to the "Lessons of Empire" seminar by George Steinmetz and Jack Snyder brought out the distinctions among such modes of intervention by a powerful polity in the affairs of weaker ones: imperial (intervening in another polity without actually governing it), hegemonic (setting the rules of the game which others must follow), and colonial (governing internal affairs of a subordinated polity). These do not in fact exhaust the possibilities, and historically the category of "empire" includes a considerable range of ways in which the incorporation of different population groups and the differentiation of those groups was managed and contested.

[4]Donald Hepburn, "Nice War. Here's the Bill," *The New York Times*, September 3, 2003, A19. The author is not a liberal academic or development professional, but an oil executive.

This definition of the task rings a bell for an historian of the British and French empires in Africa. It does not sound like colonialism in general, but very much like the colonialism of the post-World War II era, when the leading colonial powers, trying to reestablish their legitimacy and make their empires more orderly and productive, acknowledged the mediocrity of their past economic and social contributions to the colonies and proclaimed a new policy of "development." The goals of the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act (passed in 1940 and put into operation in 1945) and the French Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development of 1946 sound remarkably like those mentioned above. And the effort lasted about one decade, when British and French governments, frustrated by the difficulties of such a transformative project, realized that their taxpayers would not be willing to pay the bill to carry them through, that the interventions would produce more conflict than they would appease, and that giving up empire—once the goals were set so high—was more prudent than trying to make it work.

Looking further back, the now quite large history of empires goes against much of the polemic usage of the concept of empire, stressing that empire is a form of limited rule, limited both in relation to the exercise of totalizing power and to the will and ability to transform societies. When Britain and France rather belatedly got serious about using colonization as a tool of social transformation, they very quickly backed off.[5] So let me examine in more detail the notion of limits of empire—even in cases of extreme power asymmetry—and the contradictions of modernizing colonialism.

In proclaiming a "civilizing mission" certain leaders in the French Third Republic in the 1870s were trying to convince colleagues and voters that colonial conquest was not necessarily too adventurous for a bourgeois society and too militaristic for a republic. The new subjects would neither be fully incorporated nor held in a state of permanent otherness. That was congruent with older notions of the French empire as an inclusive but differentiated polity: it had a core in European France, "old colonies," notably in the Caribbean, where since 1848 all inhabitants were citizens, outposts in South Asia and Senegal where inhabitants had some of the rights of citizens, and Algeria, which was an integral part of the metropole, but which excluded the majority of the population from citizenship. In the late nineteenth century, France was acquiring "new colonies," whose people would be subjects but not citizens, and protectorates, which were states that had voluntarily ceded part of their sovereignty to France while retaining their own "nationalities." The Republican colonizers claimed that France could take on new subjects as long as it committed itself to "civilizing" them and giving them citizenship as they proved their worth. This processual vision of colonization presumed that the Empire was a unit of political and moral significance. The Saint Domingue (Haitian) Revolution of 1791-1804 had much earlier put on the table the question of whether the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen applied to the colonies, barely after it had been issued in Paris.[6]

The British had no analogous citizenship construct—all were subjects of the Queen—but the antislavery movement had an even greater impact

[5]This article draws on previously published research. For the general argument about the ambiguities of colonial rule, see Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1-56, and for the argument about the late—and abortive—episode of colonial modernization, see my *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[6]Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

You can't compare empires let alone learn their lessons if you don't know what counts as empire, or if all that does count is what was done by whoever did as the Romans did. So with respect to the unit of analysis and historical depth, as with historical truth and the uses of history for life, I adopt a purely pragmatic approach. You do what you can do and take what you can get—no guarantees, no absolutes, no boundaries.

Sheldon Pollock
University of Chicago

It's important not to be too clear about historical lessons—we have to leave room for allusion and ambiguity.

Sugata Bose
Harvard University

History provides answers not just to such questions as "who's bigger," but to the more important question of how other great powers have sought to reorder the world, and with what results.

Matthew Connelly
Columbia University

What Amit Rai calls the "rule of sympathy"—and the social hierarchies such sentiments help create—were integral to the founding and funding of imperial enterprises. Appeals to moral uplift, appreciation of cultural diversity, and protection of "brown women and children" against "brown men," were not only joined with coercive administrative colonial practices. These were woven into the very weft of empire—how control over and seizure of markets, land, and labor were justified and worked out.

Ann Laura Stoler
University of Michigan

AP Photo/John Moore

Gestures to anticipate or answer the needs of the world's poor are understood neither as primary duties nor as prudential deals benefitting both parties, but rather as actions outside self-interest, as charity, as gifts, as donations, putting recipients into debt. Citizens and shareholders react with weariness when the needy ask for more, and with honest outrage when the abject aren't satisfied or grateful for what has already been given.

John Kelly
University of Chicago

in insisting that how people in the Empire were treated, whatever their color or culture, could be a stain on the British flag. Conquest in the late nineteenth century was in large part made meaningful to the British public, or that part of it which cared, because the influential missionary lobby had since the 1860s put forth a picture of Africa as a benighted continent, still distorted by an internal slave trade, ruled by tyrants and in need of redemption. The experience of the empire, however, was already ambiguous: hopes of redeeming the already British slaves of the West Indies had been dashed by the unwillingness of many of those ex-slaves to play the role of dutiful free laborer assigned to them, and they had been increasingly portrayed as racial exceptions to the rule of optimizing behavior under free markets and just government. The discourses of redemption and unredeemable inferiority coexisted uneasily in imperial discourse at the end of the nineteenth century.[7] And alongside this ambivalence, officials read the risks of pushing too hard in different ways: the Indian Mutiny of 1857 led the government to insist that India be governed firmly but carefully.

Empires were both incorporative and differentiated polities. Too sharp differentiation and the intermediate authorities on whom the center depended would have no stake in cooperation, too much incorporation and demands for political voice or autonomy would be enabled. That certain issue networks in France and Britain saw the space of empire in moral terms and argued that enslavement or abuse of subject populations violated imperial integrity did not prevent imperial governments and settlers from being brutal or exploitative, but it did insure that scandals would be a periodic feature of imperial governance in democratic states: over slavery, massacres, colonial wars, forced labor, and poverty.

The politics of imperial reformers interacted uneasily with political movements among colonized populations themselves, but such movements did not limit themselves to a dichotomous choice between demanding full participation in an imperial polity on that polity's own terms or the transformation of difference into national autonomy. Different forms of cultural assertion and different claims to political voice and representation—from turning colonies into departments of France, to turning empire into a federation of distinct nationalities, to other forms of transnational connection (pan-Islamism, pan-Africanism)—were parts of political mobilization within and against empires. Until the very end of colonial rule, the overlap of these different sorts of movements underscored the importance of empire as a unit in which political morality, rights, and well-being were debated and marked the instability of the balance of inclusion and differentiation. That empire, over the last two hundred years, has provoked debate within imperial metropoles, organizing by international networks, and opposition and mobilization within colonies—using and challenging the ideologies of imperial powers themselves—lies behind concerns voiced today over the political consequences of how the United States or another power acts when it intervenes forcefully outside its borders.[8]

Actually ruling an empire was more complicated than civilizers,

[7]Thomas Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[8]Hence the great concern among the advocates of a new imperialism that it be done right, that its considerable costs be recognized, and that the new imperial power acts in a way that is consistent with the rule of law and international opinion.There is much room for doubt on all these fronts, as acknowledged in Michael Ignatieff, "The American Empire: The Burden," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 2003.

reformers, and redeemers admitted. The great advantage of a conquering power in the age of the telegraph and Maxim gun was the ability to concentrate forces and then move onward. Colonization meant raiding a village, visibly terrorizing its population, seizing the cattle, burning the huts, and going elsewhere. Routinizing control was another story, and it meant going against the logic of any civilizing mission or project of building a new political order. The only way to administer the large spaces and dispersed populations of Africa was to co-opt local elites into doing the dirty work. "Indirect rule" was a fact in Africa—as it had been in many other empires—long before it was a doctrine. Moreover, both France and Britain treated as sacrosanct an old imperial doctrine: colonies should pay for themselves. Even the famous imperial advocate Sir John Seeley said in regard to India in the 1880s, "It is a condition of our Indian Empire that it should be held without any great effort." British and French colonialism, at least up to World War II, was colonialism on the cheap: the colonies were supposed to pay the costs of their own repression.[9]

Niall Ferguson, in the body of his book *Empire*, makes clear that British rule was constrained by its cheapness and reliance on intermediate authorities, then contradicts himself at the end by insisting that British rule meant rule of law, fair and honest government, the maintenance of peace, and free market policies. It neither had the will nor the capacity to play such a role, certainly not in Africa, where its rule in much of the continent depended on rigidifying the power of local authorities, on using a "customary" law that was reified as it was codified, and in settler colonies on arbitrary seizure of land from Africans and the prevention of African ownership of land elsewhere and on the segregation of public facilities. Economic policy favored British import-export firms over indigenous commercial networks, and as Ferguson admits, invoked "imperial preference" to restrict trade beyond the sterling block when it suited British needs. If the British Empire disseminated lessons in law and free markets to the "white" colonies, Africans were taught something else.[10]

At times, officials in the early years of African colonization sought to turn African cultivators or African slaves into wage workers or productive farmers. The zeal behind such efforts

[9]Seeley cited in Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 200), 108. For the argument that Britain was a "wary titan" never willing to make the effort to organize an international order, rather than a "weary titan"—a once hegemonic power that subsequently lost its initiative, see John M. Hobson, "Two Hegemonies or One? A Historical-Sociological Critique of Hegemonic Stability Theory," in Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse, eds., *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001* (London: Ashgate, 2003), 316.

[10]Ferguson, *Empire*. Compare the conclusions, 357-70, with the core of the book. For an argument about the exercise of colonial power through the "decentralized despotisms" of African chiefs under British authority, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Subject and Citizen: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Mamdani is convincing in demonstrating British intent, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, to rule through "tribal" entities, but does not explore the cross-cutting linkages that Africans developed or the extent to which political mobilization in the 1940s and 1950s developed viable alternatives, at least for a time. On law, see Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

The proponents of war in the case of the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, the British invasion of Egypt in 1882, and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, all represented themselves as saviors and liberators of the peoples of the country invaded. In each case the ruling cliques of the countries invaded were decried as despots who oppressed the local population and menaced the interests of the West. In each case, the country invaded possessed economic or strategic assets of great importance to the invader, though these were played down in the speeches politicians and military men gave about the war. In each case, the country invaded possessed economic or strategic assets of great importance to the invader, though these were played down in the speeches politicians and military men gave about the war. France needed Egyptian wheat, and saw holding Egypt as a way to challenge British domination of the Mediterranean and of South Asia. The British in 1882 desperately needed to protect their control of the Suez Canal, which had become essential to their imperial interests in Africa and Asia. The Americans in 2003 sought an oil ally that could substitute for what they saw as an increasingly unreliable Saudi Arabia. In each case, local collaborating elites were sought who might help establish a sister regime to that of the Western invader. The French sought a French Directory similar to, but subordinate to their own. The British in Egypt restored a viceroy to his throne and ultimately authorized a toothless Chamber of Deputies. The Americans appointed a supposedly representative Interim Governing Council, the explicit task of which was said to be preparation for democratic elections.

Juan Cole
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Even quite conservative imperial states like the Ottoman and Romanov empires undertook state programs of economic and social "modernization." Needing to justify the rule of foreigners over peoples who were constituting themselves as nations, the idea of developing inferior or uncivilized peoples became a dominant source of imperial legitimation and continued well into the twentieth century.

Ronald Grigor Suny
University of Chicago

Because the populations colonized in the 19th and 20th centuries were almost always already familiar with their conquerors prior to annexation, they were believed to be capable of strategically manipulating the codes of colonizer and colonized. The perceived instability of the colonized—codified in ubiquitous discourses of lying, cheating, trickery, and mimicry—specified "native policy" as the modern colonial state's central task. Native policy consisted of efforts to stabilize the colonized by urging and compelling them to adhere to a single, constant definition of their own culture. Although the quest for markets and raw materials was certainly a dominant motive in the *acquisition* of colonies during the late 19th century, the problem of native regulation and stabilization became paramount once these regimes were up and running, often overshadowing immediate economic considerations.

George Steinmetz
University of Michigan

quickly burned out, partly because the very authorities on whom rulers depended were likely to have an interest in maintaining people in a dependent status (even if slavery was formally ended), partly because the need for export crops was too acute for authorities to ask too many questions about how they were produced, and partly because new actors, notably white settlers, pushed for short cuts around "free" labor principles. By winks and nods, officials—sometimes over the protests of missionaries—accommodated themselves to a variety of forms of labor organization in African territories. By World War I, officials were congratulating themselves on having the wisdom not to change African society too much.

In the early 1920s, French and British governments rejected "development" programs that would have used metropolitan funds to foster a more systematic usage of African resources, both in the name of the old doctrine of each colony paying its way and partly because key figures did not want to upset tacit arrangements with African local authorities.[11] Private capital investment was little more aggressive as British capital exports went to old colonies and dominions, Europe, and the United States, and what little went to Africa went overwhelmingly to mines.[12] Throughout this time, islands of export productivity were carved out: mining zones surrounded by vast impoverished areas from which back-and-forth migrant laborers could be recruited; areas of white settlement where farmers received considerable help from the state in recruiting and disciplining labor; and areas of cultivation by African farmers, small or medium scale, who used family labor, tenants and clients, and sometimes wage labor. Attempts to build either an indigenous or a settler capitalism ran up against the situation that most Africans had some land resources, even if these were squeezed by alienation, that colonial economies opened up new niches which were alternatives to subservience to an employer, and that employers themselves did not necessarily want to play by the rules of a wage-labor economy.[13] Infrastructure focused on the narrow pathways of an import-export economy. Urban centers provided little infrastructure for long-term workers and families. Such an economic structure permitted some firms to make large profits, but gave every incentive to Africans to find alternatives to full involvement in a wage-labor or cash crop sector.

The mediocrity of colonial economic performance made it easier for colonial powers to slough off the dislocations of the 1929 Depression into a countryside that they did not have to examine. By the end of the decade, however, British officials began to recognize that even weak economies in Africa and the West Indies produced social dislocation, particularly in the narrow channels of communication and islands of wage-labor production. When production haltingly increased (and with it inflation), a wave of strikes began, from Barbados to Mombasa. The Colonial Office, through a series of commissions and internal arguments, finally came to recognize the woefully inadequate infrastructure and the poverty in both its old, West Indian, and new, African, colonies. With the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, it finally committed metropolitan funds, with the specific intention of strengthening colonial economies for long-run development and improving the welfare of at least those colonial subjects in the

[11]Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940* (London: Cass, 1984).

[12]S. Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa; its Course and Effects* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938). On the ambivalence of French capital regarding colonial investment, see Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français: Histoire d'un divorce* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984).

[13]On the limits of capitalist development in rural Africa, see Sara Berry, *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

"modern" sector. It was only then that the piecemeal and underfunded initiatives of colonial governments in the realm of health, agricultural technology, and urbanism were aggregated under the rubric of "development."

During the brief Popular Front rule in 1936-38, the French government also undertook an auto-critique of its initiatives in Africa, and found them wanting: too much coercion, not enough incentive for Africans to participate voluntarily in export production, feeble infrastructure. But once again the legislature refused to spend money on development programs. The right-wing government of Vichy in the early 1940s came up with a plan for the unblinking and systematic exploitation of Africa, but not with the money to implement it. The war, the strike wave—which hit French Africa right after the war—and other conflicts within African colonies, the turmoil in other colonies, notably Vietnam and North Africa, and the changed international environment put pressure on the French Government, like the British, to articulate and implement an effort to make colonialism progressive, hence the post-war development drive and various efforts at political reform. Unlike the older category of "civilization," development focused on concrete changes and potentially measurable progress. While the category marked a hierarchy between those who had achieved development and those who had not, it also constituted a language in which claims could be posed for the resources to advance along the path.

But the development framework did not bring social questions under control. Labor was a restive force, which British and French officials tried to domesticate by importing to Africa the techniques of industrial relations. Given the vast and still untransformed African countryside, trying to define, train, and acculturate an African workforce in the key sites of production and commerce in mines and cities and along railroads meant separating it from its rural origins, a policy known as "stabilization." This meant paying wages adequate to support a family and bringing the next generation of workers up under the surveillance of experts in nutrition, education, and labor relations. Labor unions realized the vulnerability of colonial regimes to collective action in the narrow channels of a colonial economy, as well as the vulnerability of the ideological efforts to demonstrations of discontent. Once the colonial regimes were no longer able to defend a racially defined boundary, the claims to "equal pay for equal work"—posed in the very language of developmental colonialism—were hard to shunt aside.

The French case is an especially vivid demonstration of the volatility of a supranational polity, in which the effort of the metropole to define itself as the model and reference point for progress leads, unintentionally, to an escalation of claims placed in the language of imperial ideology. In 1946, the French legislature, which then contained a small minority of colonial representatives, passed a law that abolished the distinction between subject and citizen. The citizenship law may have been intended to give Africans a minority voice in French institutions while denying them control over their own destiny—meanwhile inscribing Greater France as indissoluble and unitary—but the effect was more profound than that. Once the normality of racial distinction was stripped from imperial ideology, the notion of empire as a political and moral unit became an empowering one for social movements. Trade unions claimed equal pay for equal work; veterans claimed full benefits; students rejected inferior schooling; political parties demanded more spending on health care and urban amenities—all within a rhetoric of French citizenship. The argument was underscored by strikes and other forms of collective action, but it also appealed to officials whose own hopes for remaking empire depended on Africans taking seriously the premises of modernizing imperialism. While African political movements did increasingly claim more autonomy, they also made

AP Photo/Dana Smillie

full use of imperial institutions and the rhetoric of citizenship to make claims. A French minister in 1956 summed up the turn that late imperial politics had taken: citizenship had come to mean "equality in wages, equality in labor legislation, in social security benefits, equality in family allowances, in brief, equality in standard of living."[14]

It is thus only in the last phase of colonial rule that something like the project of a reformist imperialism was implemented with any degree of seriousness. And this effort was short-lived. The basic problem with developmental colonialism was two-fold, and both are quite relevant to considerations about the present. One problem was domestic: the empires of France and Britain had been empires-on-the-cheap. Post-war colonialism promised to be expensive.[15] And this promise was soon fulfilled. The development effort clogged on the retrograde infrastructure of African colonies, while African workers were in a good position to claim higher wages and benefits and this drove up the costs. The colonial archives betray the frustration of officials in the early 1950s at the slowness of results on the development front.

[14]Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Assemblée Nationale, *Débats*, 20 March 1956, 1072-73.

[15]This point is also made by Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (1994).

Domestically, empire was becoming a hard sell, and by the mid-1950s, the cost was being questioned in the press and legislature in France and Britain.[16]

The second problem was in Africa itself. The reformist effort produced more conflict than it alleviated. Trade unions became confident and escalated their demands. The most successful farmers complained of discrimination in produce markets, while the least successful complained—and sometimes revolted—because of the loss of security in a more competitive environment.[17] All this followed when the logic of empire met the logic of the welfare state, with the logic of immutable racial distinction no longer available. The responsibility of the state became the empire as a whole, and social and political organizations throughout the empire were prepared to raise issues of equivalence and equality in imperial space.

In the end, it was the French and British governments that blinked: they could not accept the costs of modernizing colonialism, when the political and economic benefits were so uncertain. In French Africa, Africans were still debating whether to push for more autonomy or a fuller French citizenship when the French government decided to devolve most power, including that over the budget, to the individual colonial territories. The unit in which citizens would seek equality—and the resources to pay for it—would become the territory, not the Empire. For France, as for Britain, this meant effectively renouncing the power of imperial control, but for Africans who took the bargain it meant renouncing claims on those resources in favor of territorially bounded power.

The colonialism that collapsed first in Africa was colonialism at its most reformist. The oldest and least dynamic of the African colonizations, that of Portugal, would be the last to go. It is important to think beyond the common notion of an obdurate, unchanging colonial edifice falling before the assaults of heroic uprisings. The uprisings in sub-Saharan Africa, notably in Madagascar, Kenya, and Cameroon, were put down successfully; so too, for that matter, was the military side of Algeria.[18] But the threat came from collective action within the colonial edifice too, from Africans who turned the modernization arguments of Britain and France into claims to resources and whose strikes, demonstrations, and other campaigns—in the shadow of Algeria, Suez, Vietnam, and other colonial crises—forced Britain and France into a cost-benefit calculation about colonies that they had not needed to make before.

What does this history signify for the present world conjuncture? It reveals alternative models for empire. The idea of empire as a transformative mechanism is indeed available, but one has to be careful about how one locates it. The precedents for it are not the "British Empire" or the French civilizing mission writ large. Rather, initiatives to systematically remake colonized societies appear as an alternative within colonial regimes, against other visions of colonization, from ruthless, dehumanizing extraction to the deliberate conservation of pacified indigenous communities, with a big dose of low-cost improvisation thrown in. The precedent regarding interventionist imperialism appears quite apt, but not in the way advocates of the empire model would have it: it is a precedent for getting out when the costs get high. If advocates of passing the imperial mantle from Britain to the United States worry whether Americans have the will to take on an imperial mission, the British experience should in fact reinforce their anxieties.

The other model of colonialism that seems quite relevant is what Ferguson—but not where he draws the lessons for today—calls "butcher and bolt": the tendency of colonizing regimes to pacify or punish, move on, and do a poor job of establishing routine administration. That may well be—indeed that is Ferguson's worry—what the Bush Administration has in mind.[19] In Iraq, however, bolting is proving the more difficult task.

Still another model of supposedly benevolent colonization is more consistent with a conservative administration's view of the world: a more minimalist view of keeping a colonial peace under which divided, "primitive" people are kept off each other's throats and given the chance to develop more productive agriculture and commerce under some predictable, if not exactly fair, administrative and judicial control.[20] Familiarity with the past again should lead to skepticism about this future. The colonization of Africa extinguished certain forms of conflict—one need not invent

[16]An influential series of articles in the Paris press by a conservative journalist led to a public discussion of whether African colonies paid, at a time when the Overseas Ministry was producing ambiguous reports on the results of the development process. In Great Britain, Prime Minister Macmillan, not long after Suez, commissioned a colony-by-colony cost-benefit analysis, with not particularly encouraging results. See Cooper, *Decolonization*, chapter 10.

[17]A notorious case of economic growth leading to revolt was the Mau Mau Emergency that broke out among the Kikuyu of Kenya in 1952. It followed not only the intensification of agriculture on white settler farms—and hence the expulsion of many Kikuyu squatters who had combined labor for whites with their own farming—but also the acceleration of market-oriented agriculture by better-off Kikuyu (following the lifting of racial restrictions on coffee growing), who would not let expelled squatters obtain land in their former villages. Mau Mau was very much a crisis of intensified "development." See John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book Two: Violence and Ethnicity* (London: James Currey, 1992); Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905-63* (London: James Currey, 1987).

[18]For an interpretation of the Algerian revolution which punctures the myth of victorious armed struggle and emphasizes that international factors shaped the outcome, see Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). More generally, I have written about the relationship between struggles within empires and struggles against empires in "Mobilization and Accommodation," paper for a Conference at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, March 2003.

[19]Niall Ferguson, "The Empire Slinks Back: Why Americans Don't Really Have What It Takes to Rule the World," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 2003, 52-57. The phrase "butcher and bolt" comes from *Empire*, 179.

[20]Deepak Lal makes a tortured argument for an American imperialism that detaches minimalist overrule from a reformist or moralizing agenda. It fails to confront the difficulty of detaching minimalist rule-making from the ideological baggage which attaches to legal and administrative institutions. And it misreads the current American administration, which often sounds as if maintaining its Christian fortress is its prime objective and which evinces little interest in submitting itself to any form of accountability except its own. Deepak Lal, "In Defense of Empires," Speech to American Enterprise Institute, October 30, 2002, available on the web at www.aei.org/include/news-print.asp?newsID=14835.

a romantic image of pacific Africa to question the idea of a colonial peace. But the roots of present-day African conflicts lie significantly in the ethnicization which the colonial strategy of ruling through indigenous elites—frozen in place by the colonizing authority—fostered out of more shifting patterns of cultural difference and the efforts of rulers to recruit clients and followers. Rule of law was hardly a colonial accomplishment: such a notion was cut across by racial segregation in employment, residence, and public accommodations and by the notion that Africans should be ruled by "custom" and that their land could only be "communal." When after World War II British and French governments at last tried to reduce the racial exclusions that were part of daily life in the colonies with the notable exceptions of colonies of white settlement—that was part of the ambitious modernization of imperialism, with all the costs and conflicts that this entailed. As an American administration not noted for its reformist social agenda seems to be discovering in Iraq, establishing rule of law, predictability in economic transactions, and intercommunal respect may well be among the most expensive, least certain, and long-term processes there are. Only the blindness of certain conservatives to the complexity of social life and their unawareness of the conflict-ridden histories of twentieth-century empires makes it possible for them to see colonial occupation as a precedent for establishing legality and transparency in administration.

Ferguson's argument for the passing of the imperial mantle from Great Britain to the United States is, in the end, not an argument about empire at all. The bulk of his book *Empire* is scrupulous enough to dissociate "empire" as a political form from rule of law, honesty, concern for others, and the generalization of the benefits of economic development. In the concluding pages, these virtues are linked not to the messy and often sordid story of empire, but to the image of a British man assuming the "White Man's Burden" and saving those people who cannot save themselves.[21]

But the brief episode of modernizing imperialism, British and French style in the 1950s, still bears thinking about, not so much for what it was as for its unintended consequences: the escalation of claims phrased within the language of post-war imperialism. This story is a reminder that the terms of politics are not static and that policies which take a world power deeply into the affairs of another state will likely have repercussions far beyond their intended objective. We need to think precisely about the specificities of institutions and the possibilities of different languages by which political movements make claims and challenge established orders. We are not stuck with a choice between a politics of nation-states and citizenship and an amorphous globality or between inviolable sovereignties and unrestrained interventions. The sooner we start thinking with care and precision about the space in between the better. ■

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[21]Ferguson's evoction of this overwrought and overused text of Kipling is in *Empire*, 369.

Readers interested in this essay would also profit from reading *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)—ed.

The US conception of its role in territories which it has recently conquered, either singly or jointly, does not appear to be one of long-lasting direct occupation. This is already clear with Afghanistan, and it is also very likely to be the case in Iraq. Rather, it corresponds to an idea of creating client-states, with a level of sovereignty that is less than total, rather like the notion of 'indirect rule' in the context of the British empire, or the *republica de indios* in Spanish America. We may reasonably see the United States as gradually accumulating a series of such client-states in the years to come, but that still will not in fact constitute an empire. Nor is it clear that these régimes are totally different from client-states that the United States has had in the past, such as Iran under the Shah, or Chile under Pinochet.

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America needs to use its vast resources to organize global politics more successfully, but a coercive attempt to roll up the system in the name of global liberal democracy will be self-defeating. More promising would be a system of consensual domination in which America's coercive power is used selectively for purposes that enjoy broad legitimacy and are actively supported by local, regional, and multilateral institutions. Empire won't work, but a flexible, scaled-down form of hegemony by invitation just might.

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The History of Lessons: Power and Rule in Imperial Formations

By Emmanuelle Saada

On August 27, 2003, the Pentagon's special operations chiefs organized a screening of "The Battle of Algiers" in the Army auditorium. The 1966 Italian movie by Gilles Pontecorvo is a powerful account of the tactical complexities of the war in the Casbah in 1957, the escalation of violence by both the FLN and the French army, and the difficult decisions that actors within both groups faced as they became caught up in an increasingly polarized environment. (This included the screenwriter and FLN leader Yacef Saadi, who plays himself in the movie).

Pentagon officials thought they could draw "lessons" from this account of the French failure in Algeria. The flyer announcing the screening offered a pedagogical perspective: "How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas… Children shoot soldiers at point blank range. Women plant bombs in cafés. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film."[1]

The thinness of the analogy offers some easy targets, from the naive "orientalism" that binds Algerians and Iraqis into a uniform "Arab," to the naturalization of the "imperialist's" position that allows US officers to see themselves in the shoes of the French, to the erasure of the crucial historical background to the Battle of Algiers, with its trajectories of colonial urban development and segregation, the demographic explosion (caused in no small part by colonial health and social policies), the transformation of gender relations introduced by colonial domination, the deeply seated and widely shared Algerian agenda for national independence, the complex coalitions of factions that led to the FLN victory, and the international context of anti-colonial movements. A military historian, finally, might emphasize the specificity of the tactical and strategic moves that shaped the battle of Algiers and made it a watershed moment in the Algerian war.

Yet the comparative impulse at work here is powerful and, in this case, points to an emerging bundle of assumptions about both empire and historical analysis among an extended network of issue entrepreneurs and audiences (a "field" as Bourdieu would say). We could ask both narrow and more general questions about the groups that compose this field—beginning, perhaps with questions about the culture of the Pentagon and about what informs the historical worldviews of its officers. A serious ethnography of the American military elite and an understanding of its historical consciousness would be valuable in understanding the kinds of lessons that are likely to be drawn.

As a more general framework, the recent surge in "empire talk" in the American popular media (displacing earlier "globalization talk") is evidence that military officers are not alone in believing that there are "lessons of empire"—both military and geopolitical. Professional historians and social scientists play a leading role in shaping this debate. Sometimes they make use of the notion of "empire" as a metaphor, sometimes as an analytical device, and somewhat less often as a reservoir of "lessons." Their thinking on this matter is prevalent in that part of the media and intellectual field closest to the field of power: in reviews like *The National Interest*, in think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute or the Project for the New American Century and maybe at the Pentagon itself. They have also found a tribune in the mainstream media.[2]

Although we need not let the terms of this debate frame our own thinking on the question, it is difficult to ignore them and their potential effects on the "imperial" formations themselves. Since its participants have recourse to historical data as a means of legitimating a political stance, it seems important not only to understand their use of history of empires but also to question the historiography it entails. Drawing from the example of modern French colonialism, which I know best, I would suggest that the imperial histories from which lessons are currently drawn miss a crucial aspect of the modern imperial experience: the way imperial and colonial projects involve a reorganization of the modes of exercise of state power—both domestically and overseas. The lack of such understanding impoverishes the analysis of both imperial formations and contemporary US projections of power.

The terms of a debate

First, one could make a good case that this turn toward historical comparison is itself a characteristic feature of imperial projects. Empires—at least European empires—frequently represented themselves as inspired by the "lessons of (former) empires": The Roman Empire was a central referent for the Holy Roman Empire and the Carolingian Empire, and, through them, for the Napoleonic Empire. In late nineteenth century, French Republicans found it difficult to refer to "Empire," which was still strongly associated with the regimes that twice ended republican experiments.

[1]David Ignatius, "Think Strategy, Not Numbers," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2003.

[2]The recent surge of the historian-qua-expert—a figure typically much less visible than the economist or specialist in international relations—calls for a sociology of the connections between academia, the administrative elite and the media. The trajectory of Niall Ferguson is perhaps the best illustration of how this circuit of recognition and status operates in the context of empire. Ferguson—soon to join the Harvard University faculty—is the author of the widely circulated and commented upon *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003). *Empire* was based on a TV series Ferguson authored and presented on the British *Channel 4*. It provided an entrée into conservative public forums such as the American Enterprise Institute as well as more mainstream media outlets such as *The New York Times Magazine*, where he jokingly admitted that he is "a fully paid-up member of the neoimperialist gang."

But Rome remained a ubiquitous referent for their colonial doctrine. It was used in the ideological construction of a sharp contrast between French and British modes of colonial domination, i.e., *assimilationist* vs. *differentialist* attitudes toward the *indigènes*. The French colonial style was depicted as a direct continuation of Roman practices of assimilation. Colonial legal theorists, in particular, were fascinated by the extension of Roman law and its long-term influence on European legal systems. In Algeria, French colonists prided themselves on being the inheritors and propagators of the "Latin race," an affirmation that gave a legitimating patina of *longue durée* to the occupation of *l'Afrique latine*.

In France, professional historians also played an important role in the elaboration of the imperial project—though less through public media than through the educational apparatus. Colonial history became part of the Sorbonne's course offerings in 1892. It attracted enough political support for the government to found a chair at the prestigious *Collège de France* in 1921. Most importantly, colonial history formed the core of the training of colonial administrators. It was a subject on the entrance exam of the elite *Ecole Coloniale* and a part of its core curriculum, from its 1889 inception on.[3]

The current public debate needs closer examination. It bears less on the actual "tactical and strategic" lessons that can be drawn from imperial experiences than on the characterization of the US as an empire. One could reasonably ask why this terminological debate has attracted so much attention, when the fact of US supremacy is not questioned. What difference does it make to speak of the US as an empire or (only as) a hegemon?[4] Even if commentators are not always eager to acknowledge it, the debate over terminology has much more to do with a political agenda than with a desire for analytic accuracy.[5] At the top of the list is the desire to salvage the notion of empire from the bad press it received from "a generation of 'post-colonial' historians anachronistically affronted by its racism" and more broadly to rehabilitate it from the various anti-imperialistic critiques of the 1960s and 70s.[6] Those who reject the characterization of the US as an empire—and who prefer, like Robert Kagan, to speak of a "global *hegemon*"—do so in order to "eschew the labels of Marxism and Leninism" and to affirm that the "expansion of a free market is not, in fact, imperialism."[7] This leads Kagan to characterize the "essence of American policy" as "not imperialist" since it is based on the belief that the "expansion of American power is a good thing for America and for the world." This argument is easily debunked by those who, like Ferguson, insist on the imperial dimension of the current power projection of the US: the rhetoric of the "mission civilisatrice et libératrice" was indeed a funda-

Though concurring that Great Britain passed the mantle to the United States, Spanish readings of British and US imperial history tell a different story; the "lofty ideals" are chimerical, based on historical misrepresentations. In opposition to the Spanish colonial tradition of assimilation (especially religious and linguistic) and miscegenation, the Anglo-Saxon empires have been characterized by racial and religious segregation and a ruthless concern for economic efficiency and rationality; in José del Perojo's late 19th century rendering: "For the Englishman in America, in Australia, in every part of world, the native is not only not an element of fusion for his race, but actually an impediment, an obstacle to his colonizing plans." In short, the criticisms of US actions in the Middle East made by Spaniards (not including the Prime Minister, José María Aznar) are not proof of reflexive and unthinking anti-Americanism as many North American pundits would like to believe about Europeans in general; rather, they emerge from deep histories and memories of Spain's own experiences of empire and decolonization in the nineteenth century, always crafted, for multiple reasons, in opposition to its British and North American rivals.

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[3]Sophie Dulucq and Colette Zytnicki, "Une Histoire en marge. L'histoire coloniale en France (années 1880-années 1930), " *Genèses* 51, juin 2003, pp. 114-127.

[4]These were the positions adopted respectively by Niall Ferguson and Robert Kagan in a debate organized by the American Enterprise Institute on July 17, 2003: "the United States is, and should be, an Empire. A New Atlantic Initiative Debate," American Enterprise Institute, July 17, 2003, http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.428/transcript.asp.

[5]Stephen Peter Rosen, for example, emphasizes the analytical importance of the distinction: "Empires really are different, in form and in function, from merely powerful states. This is why certain questions emerge repeatedly in the study of empire that do not emerge in the study of conventional interstate relations. It therefore matters a great deal whether, for analytical as opposed to rhetorical purposes, contemporary American power is indeed imperial in nature." But the distinction he provides between empires and powerful states is far too general to be of real analytical use: "Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behavior within the subordinate states. Merely powerful states do the former, but not the latter." (Stephen Peter Rosen, "An Empire, if you can keep it," *The National Interest* 71, spring 2003, pp. 51-61, p. 51.)

[6]Niall Ferguson, "The Empire Slinks Back," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 2003.

[7]Robert Kagan in his oral contribution to the debate "the United States is, and should be, an Empire," AEI, July 17, 2003.

mental feature of European imperialisms in nineteenth century. Beyond this "definitional matter," Ferguson and Kagan agree that "the US has a critical role in maintaining world order." Kagan's objective is to "constantly argue the case for why the US must remain engaged in the world, why it must have more constancy."[8] Ferguson's position is only marginally different: he advocates a more direct and long-term engagement in some of the troubled parts of the world. Interestingly, here the objective "lessons" of history become "political lessons." In his book on *Empire*, Ferguson noted that history teaches us that US policy *will* shift from indirect to direct rule.[9] In his many interventions in the public debate, he has repeatedly argued that it *should* do so: "Americans need to go there. If the best and brightest insist on staying home, today's unspoken imperial project may end—unspeakably—tomorrow."[10]

This is not the place to take issue with the political agenda articulated here, but rather to observe that it rests on a deeply problematic colonial historiography. The basic categories that Kagan and Ferguson deploy (*direct* vs. *indirect rule*; *formal* vs. *informal empire*) are the product of nineteenth century "colonial (administrative and legal) science" and were appropriated by the actors reflecting upon their own practices. Those categories had more to do with ideological constructions and the "politics of comparison" than with an accurate description of actual practices of rule: the opposition between *direct* and *indirect rule* was to a large extent the political construction of metropolitan intellectuals both in France and Great Britain and was an element in evolving nationalist strategies of constructing distinctions.[11] As scholars, we cannot appropriate those categories uncritically, leaving out a genealogical analysis of their production and usages.

There are other troubling aspects in this demonstration. Ferguson, like others, advocates greater financial involvement of the US in direct "institution building" (in Iraq and Afghanistan). He underscores that empires were not "built on the cheap."[12] This does not take into consideration the complex reality of colonial investments. In 1900, for example, a French law required that the colonies be self-financing. For the most part, the metropolitan political class believed that the Empire would not be acceptable to the public if it had any substantial cost. Governors had to levy enough taxes to balance their local budgets and to intervene directly in infrastructure building and the construction of a working class. This had enormous consequences for patterns of colonial rule and for French metropolitan economic history.[13]

There are many other debatable "lessons": Ferguson laments that the youth of the American elite shuns direct involvement in the civil administration of territories currently occupied by the US. The French elite had the same reluctance. The French colonial administration was populated by men who came overwhelmingly from peripheral regions (Corsica) or from other colonies (mostly the Caribbean "old colonies").[14]

One could continue in this vein. The important point is that all of these claims rely on an assumption about the integrity and coherence of imperial projects, setting up the comparison between a self-confident (British) imperialism and the "organized hypocrisy" of American "Empire in denial." Ferguson strongly advocates that the US should "go there" and "stay there for a while." When he compares the 40 years of British involvement in Iraq with the few months of planned presence of the US, he obviously neglects the contingencies on which conquests and decisions to stay were predicated. He also forgets that the time frame of the colonial presence was always in question, from conquest to decolonization. In the French case, in the writing of the administrators or colonial elite, there is no moment when the horizon of the end of the colonial presence does not color the perception of the situation. Following the official doctrine of "*mise en valeur*," colonial historians of France often identify a period of "stabilization" of colonial societies after WWI and the end of the most obvious military aspects of conquest.[15] During the interwar period, economic infrastructure and the main colonial administrative and educational institutions are in place; burgeoning colonial cities begin to attract women and provide services for children. But by the 1920s, modern movements of colonial contestation have also emerged across the empire, from Indochina to North Africa, to the metropole itself. These are perceived as major threats by colonial administrators. As the most insightful historical scholarship has shown, "tensions of empire" always ran deep.[16] The "imperial project" was always evolving, always precarious and marked by an uncertain time frame. The very notion of "empire in denial" or "hypocrisy"

[8] *Ibid*. Kagan continues: "We cannot simply declare that we are an Empire and therefore it flows mechanically. We must all continue to work to make our fellow Americans understand the important role that the United States has to play. And we also have the task of convincing the rest of the world that America's actions are not purely selfish but are in the interest of many others who share its views."

[9] "The hypothesis, in other words, is a step in the direction of political globalization, with the United States shifting from informal to formal empire much as late Victorian Britain once did. That is certainly what we should expect if history does indeed repeat itself. Like the United States today, Britain did not set out to rule a quarter of the world's land surface. As we have seen, its empire began as a network of coastal bases and informal spheres of influence, much like the post-1945 American 'empire.' But real and perceived threats to their commercial interests constantly tempted the British to progress from informal to formal imperialism. That was how so much of the Atlas came to be coloured imperial red." (Ferguson, *Empire*, op. cit., p. 368.)

[10] Ferguson, "The Empire Slinks Back."

[11] Véronique Dimier, "Direct or Indirect Rule: Propaganda around a Scientific Controversy," in Tony Chafer, ed. *Propaganda and Empire in France* (London and New York: Macmillan, 2002).

[12] In "Empire on a Shoestring" (*The Washington Post*, July 20, 2003), Ferguson argues that it is not possible to "run" an Empire on the "Wal-Mart principle of 'always low prices.'"

[13] See Bruce Berman, "Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial Africa," *Development and Change* 15, n °2, avril 1984, pp. 161-202 and Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français : histoire d'un divorce* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984).

[14] Ferguson is also rather inconsistent on this point: both in his book and his popular writing, he argues that the British Empire was a venue for upwardly mobile Scotts and Irishmen and he compares this process to the overrepresentation of African Americans in the US army.

[15] Morocco became a protectorate in 1912 and the mandates over Togo, Cameroon, Lebanon and Syria were granted in 1919 and 1920.

[16] On this, see Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1997).

misses something important about the complexities of imperial arrangements. In France, the word "Empire" never appears in constitutional texts or law in reference to the *colonial* empire. The only document that frames the legal relationship between metropole and colonies of the modern Empire is the *Senatus-consulte* of 1854, which offered only an extremely loose legal framework. Subsequent republican legislatures never replaced it, even though its constitutionality was often in debate. Similarly, the administrative organization of the colonies was too fragmented to conform to a conventional understanding of "empire." Among territories under French rule, there were colonies (overseen by a *Ministère des Colonies* after 1894), protectorates and mandates (for which the *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères* was in charge) and the three departments of Algeria. The word "Empire" itself was used only rarely, especially before the interwar period. For the Republicans, it smacked too much of the Napoleonic Empires. For a long time, it also connoted a mode of domination through conquest at odds with the "spiritual" universalism of the "Great Nation." According to Michelet's "Picture of France," which opens his monumental *History of France*, "Great Britain is an empire; Germany is a country—a race; France is a person."[17] *L'Empire, c'est l'autre*.

The "lessons of empire" raise a further historiographic problem. The continuity posed between the "British World Order" and "US global power" is built on a history of the British Empire centered on its role as the worldwide propagator of liberal capitalism. Ferguson's main historical point is that the nineteenth-century empire "pioneered free trade, free capital movements and, with the abolition of slavery, free labour." It developed a "global network of modern communications. It spread and reinforced the rule of law over vast areas."[18] In a word, it is the first moment of a linear and irresistible history of "globalization." It is easy to point out the semantic similarities between this historical representation of Britain and the discourse of American leaders of the 1990s and 2000s. They appear in the *National Security Strategy* document of September 20th, 2002 submitted by the Bush administration to Congress as the annual report on the nation's strategic security objectives. In the very same wording of British imperial language, this document lists the objective to promote "free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and opportunity."[19] But beyond rhetorical similarities, the hypothesis of a continuity of "imperial globalization" ignores the vast amount of historical scholarship that demonstrates that liberal capitalism was never a ready made product to be exported, but rather something shaped by colonial and imperial histories. It also completely neglects the granularity of colonial rule over different territories and the very diverse modes of economic engagement in different territories. In the French case, there was never free trade but rather a system of heavy taxation that strongly favored the metropole; the mobility of capital was extremely limited and colonial banks were under the direct control of the State; "forced labor" was prevalent throughout the empire; the movement of populations was tightly restricted and controlled.

Finally, one of the most striking features of the debate over the "lessons of empire" is the lack of interest in a close analysis of both the "colonial order" and "global power," of their modes of exercise, their concrete effects and the kinds of resistance they produce.

In the public face of this debate, there are many breathless accounts of the current extent of US "power": often, its hegemonic position is compared favorably with that of Rome and Great Britain. In a recent essay, "the Greatest Superpower Ever," Paul Kennedy who not so long ago worried about "imperial overstretch" states: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing." Everywhere, one finds litanies of the "indicators" of US power.[20]

Most of the time, the indicators used to quantify US "world power" are borrowed from the military, economic and cultural fields. Making use of very traditional categories, Ferguson refers to the "three pillars of power" and bases his characterization of the US as an empire on the "750 military bases in 130 countries," "contribution to the global economic output of 31 percent," and indications of American dominance in world cinema and television.[21] Here and in the other contributions to the debate, the "qualitative" dimension of power is left aside except for the extremely loose categories of "soft" and "hard" power.[22]

Power, always invoked as the fundamental explanatory variable, is never explained except through recourse to rough psychologizing. This is above all the case of Robert Kagan's characterization of the US as a "non-imperialist *hegemon*." In circular fashion, the gap between a "Kantian" "post-modern" Europe that has shed "power politics " in favor of collective obedience to international rules and a "Hobbesian" United States which still believes that "power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success" is explained by… the "power gap."[23] The psychology of power offered here is simple enough: those who have power tend to believe in its

[17]Jules Michelet, *History of France from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (New York : Appleton, 1845), Volume I, p. 182.

[18]Ferguson, *Empire*, p. 358-359.

[19]http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

[20]Kennedy, again, affirms: "We comprise slightly less than 5 percent of the world population; but we imbibe 27 percent of the world's annual oil production, create and consume nearly 30 percent of its Gross World Product and spend a full 40 percent of ALL (*his emphasis*) the world's defense expenditures. As I have noted, the Pentagon's budget is nowadays roughly equal to the defense expenditures of the next nine or 10 highest defense spending nations—which has never happened in history." Paul Kennedy, "The Greatest Superpower Ever," *New Perspective Quarterly* 19, Spring 2002.

[21]Ferguson, oral contribution to the debate "the US Is, and Should Be, an Empire..."

[22]The use of these terms can be traced to the work of Joseph Nye in the late 1980's as a counter to those who foresaw the decline of the United States as a great power as a result from "overstretch." See *Born to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). The notion has been more recently revisited by Nye and Keohane who identify hard with "command power" and soft with "co-optive power." See R. Keohane and J. Nye, "Power and Independence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs*, 1998, 77:5, pp. 81-94.

[23]Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 37.

For the politics of Empire, the most significant form of opposition has been, and will continue to be, from industrial societies that do not embrace liberal capitalism. That is the threat that the Axis posed to Britain and the United States, it is the threat posed by the old Soviet system, and it is the threat posed by the Communist Party that ruled China before it headed down its capitalist path. This opposition also is what unites the disparate set of countries that George W. Bush called “the Axis of Evil.” Islamist Iran, the tyrannical command economy of Iraq, and the oddly similar, if supposedly “Leninist” regime in North Korea all have embraced the industrial system. With nuclear weapons, each of the regimes might have been able to avoid incorporation into a world of liberal capitalist industrialism. At the extreme, Iran, at least, might present an industrial model that could be a viable, expanding alternative to liberal capitalism. None of this necessarily makes these regimes logical targets for imperial conquest by the United States, but it does explain why champions of liberal globalization would be concerned about these states. More significantly, it points to a general reason why states and private elites outside the US might, at times, welcome manifestations of an American itch for universal empire. The US, as the holder of most of the coercive means at the disposal of those who champion liberal capitalist industrialism, is the one “indispensable power,” even if this was not exactly Madeline Albright’s meaning when she began promoting the phrase.

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effect and have recourse to it more readily than the weaker ones who have to make do without it.[24] The way out of this circle is historical. European countries used to "believe in power" and to act according to the principles of "*Machtpolitics*." But the successive tragedies of the European twentieth century made them forgo it. After the demise of the communist bloc, this move left the US as the only actor able and willing to fight in the new "jungle."[25] Imperialism plays a prominent role in this historical demonstration, since decolonization is regarded as a fundamental step in the European trajectory toward the rejection of power.[26] It also figures centrally in Kagan's psychology of power, made up of "urges" and "atavism": "Maybe concern about America's overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Perhaps the atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons, and Frenchmen–the memory of power, international influence, and national ambition—can still be played upon. Some Britons still remember empire; some Frenchmen still yearn for *la gloire*; some Germans still want their place in the sun. These urges are now mostly channeled into the Grand European Project, but they could find more traditional expression."[27]

Like many other participants in the debate about characterizing the US as an "empire," Kagan never specifies what he means by "power." In his text, the notion acquires a kind of metaphysical dimension.[28] Very much like the notion of "Macht" according to Max Weber, "power" is here amorphous and in need of qualification. It refers both to potentiality and action, to an undefined strength and to more organized rule; it is both "*Macht*" and "*Herrshaft*", "*pouvoir*" and "*domination*." This polymorphic usage of power is far from naïve in Kagan's account. It is, I think, related to the double standard that is central to his vision of US domi-

[24]In a surprisingly simplistic analogy, Kagan states: "The differing psychology of power and weakness are easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative—hunting the bear armed only with a knife—is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't have to? This perfectly normal human psychology has driven a wedge between the United States and Europe" (*Of Paradise*, p. 31).

[25]"The United States must act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism *but* only because, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally" (*Of Paradise*, p. 99).

[26]*Of Paradise*, p. 18. In the article for *Policy Review* on the same topic, this point is even more explicit: "Europe has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance—perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history." ("Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, June 2002, p. 113)

[27]*Of Paradise*, p. 101.

[28]Power becomes a "mysterious substance that one does not question" (Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). With a very different political and theoretical agenda, Raymond Aron offered a similar critique: "The words *power* and *Macht* in English and German and *pouvoir* or *puissance* in French continue to be surrounded by a kind of sacred halo, or, if one likes, charged with mysterious and rather frightening echoes." Raymond Aron, "Macht, Power, Puissance: Democratic Prose or Demoniac Poetry?", *Politics and History* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 102-121, p. 102.

nance. Power has to prevail in the "jungle" while rules apply, potentially, to the actors in the "civilized world."[29] This notion of a double standard takes us up much closer to the historical complexities of imperial rule than Ferguson's account of empire-qua-globalization. The tensions of this double standard, the dialectics of "rule" and "power" have deeply informed the historical dynamics of modern imperialism, as the French imperial experience abundantly illustrates.

Power and rules

The period of consolidation of the French Empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century coincided with the emergence of the Third Republic in metropolitan France. Both developments were accompanied by intense political and theoretical debates about the nature of the State and its modes of domination. For French Republicans, these questions were closely linked.

At the center of these debates was the distinction between territorial and national sovereignty.[30] For the legal theorists of the late nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the *Ancien Régime* was exclusively territorial in that it "derived from the King's right on the territory." National sovereignty, in contrast, was the major invention of the French Revolution, and was by definition impersonal and detached from this material (territorial) link. The colonial exclusion of indigenous populations from citizenship challenged this distinction: it reactivated territorial sovereignty for the subjects of Empire while barring them from participating in national sovereignty.

Current discussions about the imperialist dimension of the US world presence raise similar questions. Legal practices and controversies directly engage the notion of sovereignty at the international and domestic levels, and at their complex points of intersection: the French lawyers planning to file a suit against the US administration over the detention of six Frenchmen at Guantanamo Bay claim that the US violates not only international treaties but also the sovereignty provisions of its own lease treaty with Cuba. While Washington claims that US law does not apply in Guantanamo, the 1903 lease treaty stipulates that "the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control" over the area of the Guantanamo naval base.

Most importantly, the question of sovereignty engages the dialectics of "power" and "rule" central to both colonial order and global power. French colonizers legitimated their enterprise by affirming that they would bring the "rule of law" to those who were still slaves of their (barbaric) customs. The current US administration uses essentially the

[29]"The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates Europe's post-modern norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constraint its ability to fight effectively in Robert Cooper's jungle. It must support arm controls, but not always for itself. It must live by a *double standard*" (*Of Paradise*, p. 99).

[30]See A. Esmein, *Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé* (Paris: Sirey, 1914), p. 2.

While the US emerges as seeking to establish a unilateral order against the maturing multilateralism of the previous era, the "old" Europe is now cast into the position of defending the institutions and juridification of globalization. The confusion this new alignment has led to within the so-called anti-globalization movement is telling.

Caglar Keyder
Binghamton University

If there is a reason, and not merely an excuse, to consider the United States as an imperial power, it is because it requires that we ponder the world and our place in it, and begin to think more analytically, comparatively, and historically. First, thinking about empire is a way to think about power: What it is, how it works, and what it can and cannot do. This is not usually how Americans think about foreign policy, when they think of it at all.

Matthew Connelly
Columbia University

The opening minutes of the Russell Crowe film, Gladiator, narrate a dramatic confrontation between the armies of imperial Rome and the wild German tribes who resist them. The Germans reject the Roman demand for submission in fairly forthright style—by sending the emissary back to the legions' lines, still mounted but headless. As the gory figure gallops into view and the barbarians roar defiance, one of Crowe's legionary sidekicks says simply: "People should know when they're conquered." It's a scene and a line which could be—and no doubt by now have been—used to kick off student discussion on any and every aspect of the history of empires. "People should know when they're conquered." Discuss, with reference to ancient Rome, medieval Ireland, Victorian Maori or Zulu, 21st-century Iraqis… But there is of course a parallel assertion, less often posed in quite those words but only a little less central to the current structure of debate: "People should know when they are conquerors." (How) should US—or British—citizens today react to being (perceived by others to be) hegemons, imperialists or aggressors? What stories do they tell themselves about their countries' global roles? How do these relate to their conceptions of national and other identities? How far or in what ways—if, indeed, at all—have notions of themselves as "being imperial" entered into, or even been in some strong sense constitutive of, such identities and the more local senses of space and place which frame them?

Stephen Howe
Ruskin College

same rhetoric. The National Security Strategy document states: "America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property."[31]

Of course, the project of exporting the "rule of law" through "power politics" is marked by an inherent tension. It did not take long for colonial administrations in all parts of the French Empire to realize that forcing French "rule of law" on the indigenous populations was practically impossible. It also went against the pledge made by the French State in all cession treaties to "respect the religion" of the indigenous peoples.[32] The double standard of law and rules finally prevailed. While French law applied to French *citizens* in the territories, indigenous *subjects* remained subjected to both their customary rules and to French "power." The contradiction between the civilizing mission of the rule of law and the demands for colonial order was intense, as evidenced by the complex history of the special criminal law applicable to indigenous peoples, the *Code de l'indigénat*. Contrary to all republican legal principles, it defined crimes specific to the *indigenes* and gave the colonial executive



AP Photo/David Guttenfelder

branch entire discretion over judgments and punishment. This legal regime was a way to dress power in the clothes of rules. The first *Code de l'indigénat* was voted by the Parliament for Algeria in 1881. Criticized by some as a "legal monster," the Code was approved only for a limited term of 7 years. The assumption was that once "power" had cleared the

[31]http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

[32]In the capitulation treaty of the Bey of Algiers 1830, France pledged not to "encroach on the inhabitants' freedom and religion." Bush made the same promise to the Iraqi people shortly after the fall of Baghdad: "We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq's future."

Algerian "jungle," "rules" would finally prevail. The line of reasoning is strikingly similar to Kagan's argument. Ultimately, this temporary solution to the tension inherent to the double standard was reenacted every seven years until 1944. At each new parliamentary vote on the question, legislators pledged that it was only a provisional measure. Meanwhile, the *Code de l'indigénat* became the most infamous symbol of colonial domination for the Algerians and for all other French colonial subjects.

Regulations such as the Patriot Act (2001) and the Military Order of November 11, 2001 on the "detention, treatment and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terror" raise the same question of the relationship between "power" and "rules." They also entail a distinction between those who are entitled to rules and those who are submitted to power, i.e., between those to whom the 5th and 6th amendments apply and all the rest. Although the Supreme Court has historically held that those amendments applied to "persons" who are not citizens—such as permanent alien residents who remain "physically present" in the United States—citizenship and place of legal residence have recently become crucial criteria of distinction.[33] As many commentators have remarked, the current modalities of detention of suspected al-Qaeda members and the project of forming military tribunals implies a blurring of the distinction between the rules of war and those of criminal justice. This is a recurrent pattern in moments of crisis of the colonial order: during the Algerian War, the manipulation of criminal justice by the French military took a very similar path toward more summary forms of justice and ultimately toward torture.[34] While the US administration denounces the use of torture, several reports have suggested that violence against captives has been used in the US-occupied Bagram air base in Afghanistan and that the US has handed over some suspects to countries with documented histories of torture. The US government has not denied these allegations, nor has it taken an unequivocal position against torture in the context of the "war against terrorism."[35]

Finally, the dialectic of "power" and "rules" does not play out only in the legal sphere of regimes of rights. It also informs changes in the technologies of power: here again the comparison between the current situation and the colonial State is striking. For both, the control of the movement of populations is a central activity. In many ways, empires have historically been characterized by the porosity of their outer frontiers and by acute attention to the control of movements from the periphery toward the center.[36] This preoccupation is now prominent in US immigration policy, whose main characteristic is the desire to "exclude the Barbarians."[37] This effort involves the implementation of identification systems (among them, the improved Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System-IAFIS) in order to better identify aliens wanted in connection with criminal investigations in the United States or abroad. But this identification apparatus also potentially applies to American citizens: in the wake of the Patriot Act, general biometric databases are receiving new attention and the old project of a national identification card system has recently reemerged. This trajectory is reminiscent of the French construction of a state apparatus for the identification of citizens and subjects. The colonial setting played the role of a laboratory for the "identifying State." The first French experiment with identity papers took place in Algeria in 1882 with the objective of controlling and limiting the movements of the indigenous population. Only in 1917 was it applied in France (to immigrants) and finally to the entire French population in the early 1950s. Modern screening techniques were also developed for and applied first to colonial immigrants to France before becoming standard practices in terms of border control.

As I have stressed through the example of France, one of the most striking lessons of empire is that the "European experience of state formation was predicated on its colonial experience."[38] Although I have suggested reasons for skepticism about the grander geopolitical lessons sought by Ferguson, Kagan, and others, I would argue that we can be fairly certain about the applicability of this one, and rightly concerned about its implications for the current situation. Because of its new modes of projection of power, the American State is undergoing a reorganization in the dialectic of "power" and "rules," at home and abroad. In France, this process was slow and incremental, following a logic that was rarely articulated at the outset. Although it is too early to judge, the war on terror seems both clearer and faster in its unfolding. This is a challenge for historians but perhaps also a more powerful occasion for critique. ■

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[33]Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the case of Zacharias Moussaoui. The administration ascribed two contradictory functions to his trial: it would be a showcase for the American justice system in its respect for formal rules *and also* a showcase of US power to suppress terrorist threats. These distinct goals have produced a deadlock as Moussaoui asserts his rights to a fair trial (specifically, the right to depose witnesses to his alleged crime). As of October 2003, the court ruling barring prosecutors from seeking the death penalty against him is under appeal by the Justice Department. The double bind between justice and security is at the center of the legal controversy surrounding the case.

[34]On Algeria, see Sylvie Thénault, *Une drôle de Justice. Les magistrats dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001).

[35]Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities," *The Washington Post*, December 26, 2002. See also the Human Rights Watch Report: "The Legal Prohibition Against Torture" of March 2003 (http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/TortureQandA.htm#detainees).

[36]On this see Maurice Duverger, *Le Concept d'Empire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980).

[37]Joseph Nye, "Surpassing Rome," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 19:2, Winter 2002.

[38]Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks, "Beyond the Fringe: the Nation State, Colonialism, and the Technologies of Power," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Volume 1, N°2, June 1988: 224-229, p. 229.

American Colonial Empire: The Limit of Power's Reach

By Julian Go*

> A brief season of war has deeply changed our thought and has altered, it may be permanently, the conditions of our national life. We cannot return to the point whence we set out. The scenes, the stage itself upon which we act, are changed. We have left the continent which has hitherto been our only field of action and have gone out upon the seas…and we cannot live or act apart.
>
> -Woodrow Wilson, August 1, 1898[1]

After September 11th, more than a few commentators have claimed that what is needed around the world is a revived colonialism under America's hand. These commentators accordingly urge us to look to the British colonial empire for guidance: "Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets."[2] Yet such calls for cross-imperial comparison elide America's own past, a past clearly reckoned in Woodrow Wilson's statement on America's novel globalism in the wake of the Spanish-American war. Wilson reminds us that the United States has long been an empire. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States seized Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, the Philippines, and the Islamic "Moro Province" of the Philippine archipelago. These acquisitions meant that the United States was not simply an "informal" empire but also a "formal" colonial empire. They meant, as one colonial official at the time put it, that "the United States has definitely entered the class of nations holding and governing over-seas colonial possessions."[3] This was an empire that spanned the globe. It encompassed millions of imperial subjects and paralleled, as well as ideologically rivaled, that of England. Do we forget that Kipling's infamous poem, "The White Man's Burden," was written for the United States after the Spanish-American war, not for Kipling's own British compatriots?

Perhaps when we consider questions of empire today, we need not look anywhere else than America's own imperial past. We might look, for instance, at the imaginings and visions that gave America's new overseas empire its meaningful form. We might also look at some of the ways in which that vision was or was not realized on the ground during the first decade of America's imperial career. How did pro-expansionists envision the new empire? And as the United States faced the realities of ruling a distant peoples deemed alien and foreign, through what ruling strategies was the vision made manifest or perhaps blurred?

A Vision of Empire: Globalism and Exceptionalism

It has been noted in existing scholarship that the United States accidentally stumbled upon its overseas empire in 1898. But for many thinkers at the time, there was nothing accidental about it. Immediately after the Spanish-American war, countless intellectuals, statesmen, and colonial officials made haste to claim that overseas empire—and more specifically, the direct domination of the "lesser races" by the "superior races"—was inevitable. The inevitability arose not from the threat of terrorism but from the forces of increased globalism and presumptions of racial superiority. Bernard Moses, who later served in the Philippines, claimed that because of "modern means of communication" and the ever-present "commercial motive," the world was becoming one. Any notion that the "lesser races" could develop autonomously, therefore, was simply "utopian." The "superior races" were bound to empire.[4] Wilson (then a professor at Princeton whom colonial officials often cited) likewise spoke of European political and commercial expansion, as well as advances in technology, that had created a "new world order." In the new order, "no nation can live any longer to itself" and the West would necessarily dominate the East. "The East is to be opened and transformed, whether we will it or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it."[5]

But if the United States was bound to empire, what kind of empire should it be? Pro-expansionists took up this issue as well, and in doing so they arrived at a racialized camaraderie with the British. The United States, land of Anglo-Saxons, should become an overseas empire not unlike the British empire. In fact, scholars such as Franklin Giddings asserted that Americans and Britons should together form a joint Anglo-Saxon empire, fending off the Chinese and Slavs. He also took Kipling's urgings seriously, claiming that together Britons and North Americans would not only fend off competing empires but also use empire to civilize the world. As members of the "Teutonic races," the United States and England were to be "co-workers in the tasks of civilization."[6] John Burgess, Giddings' colleague at Columbia, added: "The teutonic races are instructed…with the mission of conducting the political civilization of the modern world."[7]

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[1]Woodrow Wilson, "What Ought We to Do?" in Arthur Link, ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 10 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 574-5.

[2]Max Boot as quoted in the *Boston Sunday Globe*, March 23, 2002, p. H1.

[3]William F. Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies of the United States* (New York: The Century Co., 1905), p. 7.

[4]Bernard Moses, "Control of Dependencies Inhabited by the Less Developed Races," *University of California Chronicle* 7 (1905): 3-18.

[5]Woodrow Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," *The Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXXVII, 1901.

[6]Franklin H. Giddings, "Imperialism?" *Political Science Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1898): 601.

[7]Burgess quoted in Julius Pratt *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), p. 8.

Accordingly, policy-makers and colonial officials quickly read up on the colonial endeavors of England to find more precise models for forging colonial governance. Some of the officials who administered the Islamic provinces of the Philippines even visited London's colonial office to find inspiration in the kind of colonial government that the British had constructed in Malaysia. Racial rapprochement thus fed an inter-imperial isomorphism. The hitch, however, is that nationalist sentiment soon tempered and eventually overrode it. While scholars, statesmen, and officials looked to the British empire for guidance, and while they agreed upon the idea of a racially-underpinned civilizing mission, they also proposed that the United States was better suited to the task. After reviewing the history of British colonialism in Asia and Africa, Bernard Moses claimed that British colonialism had been "reckless and tyrannical," failing to meet up to the civilizing ideal. England's own history of monarchy was the culprit, instilling in the British a conservative attitude that had been extended to their colonialism overseas. The United States, however, was special. Because it had had a unique history of liberal democracy, Americans were endowed with a political wisdom and a liberalism unmatched by any other. Thus, only the United States would be able to construct a "wise and beneficient governmental authority over a rude people" and offer its imperial subjects an "impulse and guidance toward the attainment of a higher form of life and larger liberty."[8] Woodrow Wilson added that while imperialism and civilizing was inevitable, the United States was to play a special role in the process. It was to play "a leading part" in civilizing the world. Because the United States had had the privilege of cultivating a perfect liberal democracy, it alone had the "peculiar duty to moderate the process [of imperialism] in the interests of liberty; to impart to the peoples thus driven out upon the road of change…our principles of self-help; teach them order and self-control; impart to them…the drill and habit of law and obedience."[9]

The exceptionalist paradigm for America's empire was thus born. The United States would join its European counterparts in forming a presumably enlightened empire, but its imperial mission was distinct. Rather than ruling overseas colonies for centuries as the British had been doing, and rather than ruling in a "reckless" and "tyrannical" manner, the United States would use colonialism as a mechanism for spreading the gospel of American liberal democracy. "The territories we have obtained from Spain," exclaimed President McKinley, "are ours not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, and train in the science of self-government." So added Bernard Moses: "If America has any mission outside of her continental limits, it is not to preserve among less developed peoples such institutions and customs as make for bondage and social stagnation, but to put in their place the ideas that have made for freedom, and the laws by which this nation has been enabled to preserve its freedom."[10]

The vision was simple enough, and remarkably resonant with discourses of American empire today: the United States would use its global power benevolently, taking on the task of transforming, uplifting, and democratizing its colonial domains.

"Democratic Tutelage" in Puerto Rico and the Philippines

The idea of using colonial control as a mechanism for training colonial subjects into the "art of self-government" and ultimately transforming them was not ruse. When devising colonial rule for Puerto Rico and the

[8]Moses, "Control of Dependencies," p. 7.
[9]Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," p. 297-8.
[10]Moses, "Control of Dependencies," p. 18.

Memorial to the battleship Maine, Central Park at Merchants' Gate, New York City.

So, whatever is new, it is also clear that there is something here that is old, and where the ghosts and unexorcised spectres of political orders past still haunt the imaginations of both actors and spectators. This is obviously where the historian of empires can see an opening, however far-fetched it might appear at the outset.

Sanjay Subrahmanyam
Oxford University

"Empire" is not merely a form of polity but also a value-laden appellation that as late as the nineteenth century (and even in some usages well into our own) was thought of as the sublime form of political existence (think of New York as the "Empire State").

Ronald Grigor Suny
The University of Chicago

Just as the Russian Empire was both empowered and constrained by its ideological justifications for empire, just as the Soviet empire was motivated and ultimately thwarted by its "socialist" developmentalist discourses, so the American establishment is both driven and restrained by the ideas and identities to which Americans subscribe as well as the political structures in which they become manifest. In its own self-construction, repeated and reinforced by politicians, government spokesmen, and the media, the United States is a unique country, exemplary in its freedoms, its democratic constitution and values, and its altruistic approach to the rest of the world. It wishes nothing for itself, except to extend the blessings that it enjoys to the rest of the world, blessings summed up by President Bush as "decency, freedom, and progress." Expressed American values would seem to preclude extended usurpation of the sovereignty of another people, colonialism, or even overt exploitation of the resources of another country. This is not to say that horrors associated with war, profit, racial and religious discrimination, and the self-interest of the dominant do not and will not occur, but they must be disguised, interpreted, and are always subject to challenge from others who will appeal to what they consider the proclaimed core values of American society.

Ronald Grigor Suny
The University of Chicago

It's the old logic of empire: successful dominion lies not in exercising direct coercive power over them as in turning them into us: Roman citizens, Christians, constitutional parliamentarians.

Sheldon Pollock
University of Chicago

Philippines, the first officials drew upon the exceptionalist theme and gave the tutelary ideal a palpable manifestation. Indeed, once noting that the British empire had been too "reckless and tyrannical," policy-makers and officials dismissed it as a guide for colonial government in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. They instead proclaimed a mission of "democratic tutelage" and "political education." Puerto Ricans and Filipinos would be given American-styled elections, local governments, and national assemblies so that, under the "strong and guiding hand" of American officials at the apex of the colonial state, they could learn the ways and means of American-styled self-government. Colonial subjects would vote, hold office, and help to formulate legislation, while American officials would give "object lessons" in the ways of self-government.

The process of state-building in Puerto Rico and the Philippines followed from the plan. The military rulers who first administered the colonies immediately set up local governments and held elections to staff them. This was to be, as one military official put it, a "sort of kindergarten" in democracy, initiating the process of teaching the people "our best American thought and methods."[11] The subsequent civilian administrators continued in the effort. In both Puerto Rico and the Philippines, they set up tutelary colonial states that gave extensive participation in government to the colonized. They instituted ballot systems designed to teach the "sanctity of the ballot" and, making equations between the Puerto Rican and Filipino elite on the one hand, and the corrupt "bosses" of immigrant machines at home, they used a range of techniques drawn from the Progressive movement to discipline the colonized into the ways of liberal democratic governance. Participation in the government by locals below, with supervision by American officials on high, was key. It would "constitute a valuable means of educating and instructing the local officials in the art of government and administration, by pointing out errors [and] encouraging higher ideals."[12] The overarching idea was that as Puerto Ricans and Filipinos learned their "lessons," American control would devolve, and the colonized would eventually receive full self-government, either as "a state in the Union or, if they desire it, independence."[13]

Of course, the tutelary project, manifesting as it did the American colonialists' sense of exceptionalism, faced various criticisms from their imperial counterparts. British observers, such as Mrs. Campbell Dauncey, found the idea of teaching self-government to Filipinos ridiculous. An expatriate living in Manila, she recorded in her journal:

> The [American] Ideal is this you see, that every people in the world should have self-government and equal rights. This means, when reduced from windy oratory to common-sense, that they consider these Malay half-breeds to be capable...of understanding the motives, and profiting by the institutions which it has taken the highest white races two or three thousand years to evolve. [...]

[11]"Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico," in *Annual Report of the United States War Department* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), I, p. 342.
[12]Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies*, p. 15.
[13]Taft in United States Congress, *Hearings before the Committee on Insular Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), part 3. More on the tutelage project can be found in J. Go, *Transcultured States: Elite Political Culture and US Colonialism in Puerto Rico and the Philippines* (unpublished ms.).

> When I come to think of it, America with this funny little possession of hers is like a mother with her first child, who…tries to bring it up on some fad of her own because it is so much more precious and more wonderful than any other child any one else ever had.[14]

But the American officials stood firm. In fact, to the project of "practical political education" they hitched a range of other projects. One was public education. The authorities in both colonies constructed extensive public school systems such that, by 1930, funds devoted to public schooling in both colonies trumped expenses for public health, policing, and infrastructure-construction. The idea was to provide technical skills and civics training at once, so that the "ignorant and credulous masses" would come to "know their rights" and exercise them as liberal democratic subjects.[15] The other major program was economic development. The officials constructed extensive public works systems, built central banking facilities offering flexible credit, and tried to reduce existing trade barriers between the metropole and colony. Of course, such measures in part benefited American capital, but in the officials' view, they were critical for civilizational growth. Predating modernization theories of democratization later proposed in the 1950s, officials argued that economic development stimulated by American capital would undo the putatively medieval social conditions in the two colonies and stimulate sociopolitical development. With "Yankee capital," claimed Governor Taft in the Philippines, would come the "moral improvement and the education of the people," promoting "Yankee ingenuity, Yankee enterprise, and Yankee freedom."

In short, tutelage and tranformation was more than an ideal in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The American authorities turned the colonial state itself into a mechanism of uplift, part of a ruling strategy designed to "transform this island and its people into truly American types."[16] Of course, for some scholars, this strategy might not be surprising. Does not the United States have a distinct set of liberal, anti-colonial values, orientations, and traditions that would be reflected in its imperial endeavours?[17]

Samoa, Guam, and the "Moro" Province: the Limits of Tutelage

The problem with crude appeals to American values is that they fail to account for other ruling strategies in the empire. In fact, tutelage and transformation were not applied equally. The colonial regimes in Samoa and Guam brushed the tutelage strategy aside and instead opted for a much less ambitious approach to governance. Colonial authorities in Samoa, for example, structured the government so as to keep Samoan "customs" intact rather than to eradicate and replace them. They divided Samoa into different districts corresponding to what they took to be the "ancient" sociopolitical divisions. Then, rather than holding elections to staff the administrative apparatus, they appointed hereditary native chiefs. Here the expressed model was not tutelage but indirect rule in British Fiji—a form of rule, as one colonial official put it, that would be maintained "without interfering with the deeply rooted customs of the people or wounding their susceptibilities in any way."[18]

Authorities in Guam structured their colonial regime similarly. Guam did not have hereditary chiefs, but under Spanish rule it had had native district officials known as gobernadorcillos (or "little governors"). The gobernadorcillos were typically the leading elite of the island, and the first American governors did not alter the system. They kept the preexisting positions intact without elaboration, merely reappointing the gobernadorcillos as "commissioners." Thus, unlike the political system in the Philippines or Puerto Rico, local leaders were not chosen through American-styled elections. There was no talk of "political education" at all; instead, preservation was the expressed goal.[19]

Why the difference? The reasons are complex, but one of them has to do with the distinct function that both Guam and Samoa were supposed to serve within America's imperial sphere. Essentially, Guam and Samoa were seized as coaling and naval stations; accordingly they were both put into the hands of the navy. Colonial authorities were also naval commanders and, in turn, their foremost concern was stability and order. Preservation thus became the rule for colonial rule. Policies aimed at transformation or change would do little else than disrupt "indigeneous" systems. Fittingly, when calls later surfaced from some circles in Washington to have Congress replace naval administration with civilian rule, the Roosevelt administration urged the Navy to do all it could to prevent Congressional action. "If left alone Congress will probably do nothing about providing a form of government for the Islands," wrote the White House to the Navy secretary; "The inactivity of Congress must be deemed to be an approval of the continuance of the existing government. It is very desirable that this should be so."[20]

The imperatives of naval rule also impeded other "developmental" projects. Rather than pursuing economic cum civilizational growth, for example, the naval authorities prevented landholdings deemed "traditional" from being sold without their permission. They also restricted exports and imports to prevent islanders from becoming dependent upon external forces and to impede disruptions to what the

[14]Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, *An Englishwoman in the Philippines* (London: John Murray, 1906), pp. 134-5

[15]William H Taft, *Special Report of Wm. H. Taft Secretary of War to the President on the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908).

[16]G.W. Davis to J. Bird, June 1, 1899, Archivo General de Puerto Rico, Fonda Fortaleza, box 181.

[17]This is the view presented in Stanley Karnow's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989). I offer an extended critique of the exceptionalism view in my introduction to J. Go and Anne Foster, eds. *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

[18]US Navy Department. 1901. *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1901. Part 1* (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 85-6.

[19]I discuss Guam and Samoa in further detail in J. Go, "'Racism' and Colonialism: Meanings of Difference and Ruling Practices in America's Pacific Empire," forthcoming in *Qualitative Sociology*.

[20]Quoted in Philip Jessup, *Elihu Root*, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), I, p. 349.

authorities took to be "traditional" ways of life. Authorities took the same approach to public education. While the government funded one or two public schools, neither Guam nor Samoa saw the kind of educational program carried out in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Funds devoted to education in Samoa were next to nothing; and in Guam, they took up a sparse 17 percent of the budget. To boot, the curriculum was severely restricted. While schoolchildren in the Philippines and Puerto Rico were given civics classes, students in Guam only learned "habits of cleanliness" and, at most, English. "It is not the intention," wrote the governor, "to carry the instruction of the mass much beyond that."[21]

Still, naval imperatives were not the only factors that limited the reach of tutelage in the empire. Indeed, American authorities brushed the tutelary project aside even in some parts of the Philippines, where naval bases had not been established. Specifically, they brushed it aside when dealing with the Islamic "Moros" in the southern regions of the archipelago (Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan), a group whose numbers reached close to 300,000. Here, colonial discourses of race, ethnicity, and "development" were key. When devising government for these provinces, the American authorities were quick to point out that the Moros, by their religion, were fundamentally distinct from the "Christian tribes" of the islands. Furthermore, they pointed out that the Moros had been left unpenetrated by Spain and that they were of a distinct "civilizational" stage of development. While the Christianized Filipinos had been subjected to Spanish influence, and while the Filipino elite had had some amount of education, the Moros were but a band of "wild" and "savage" tribes. Authorities saw them as akin to "the best North American Indians—[such] as the Nex Perce and Northern Cheyenne." [22]

Also important, in the Americans' view, was the fact that the Moros were plagued by internal wars and that they were geographically dispersed over an extended territory. The first American authorities had a difficult time discerning clearly-contained units of sovereignty in the provinces, much less locating "traditional" lines of authority and leadership. All of this, then, demanded a special approach. First, American authorities placed the provinces of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan into the hands of a governing department relatively autonomous from the tutelary regime in other parts of the Philippines. They thus formed a colonial state within a colonial state. Second, they put military commanders in charge, many of whom were drawn from the "Indian wars" on the frontier at home. In turn, the military commanders extended control through a series of treaties and, when necessary, through the violent suppression of resistance.

The end result was that American authorities in the so-called "special provinces" of the Philippines ruled through collaboration with Moro leaders, at least when and where they could find them (often confusing, for instance, "Sultans" and local "datus"). And in all, the idea was not to "civilize" but to keep intact—or as it was, reconstruct—the Moros' political system as best the Americans could perceive it.[23] At most, the authorities tried to curb some of the more "barbarous practices" of the Moros (such as debt relationships the Americans classified as slavery), but democratic tutelage or political education was never the goal. As one officer summarized in 1909: "We have not yet built up a state nor reached the mass of the people in any general uplifting movement…The mailed fist is the first law of the land—peace would be impossible without the actual presence of troops—for this country is neither ready nor has it ever known any other form of government."[24]

So much, then, for the exceptional American empire. The Americans had indeed articulated a lofty goal: they claimed they would use colonial occupation to teach, train, and transform (today we call it "nation-building" or "regime change"). But due to the contingencies of occupation on the ground, American authorities ultimately created an internally-differentiated imperial archipelago of multiple ruling strategies that together belied the singular exceptionalist vision.

The Tensions of Tutelage

This is not to say, however, that just because tutelage was enacted in Puerto Rico and the Philippines it went untroubled. Events on the ground disclose the internal limits and tensions of tutelary transformation even in these colonies. To be sure, in the Philippines, not all of America's imperial subjects responded positively to the Americans' designs. Revolutionaries in Luzon took up arms against American occupation, resulting in a protracted war that cost no less than 400,000 Filipino lives. America's benevolence was predicated upon violence—ballot boxes and elections were insinuated through guns and bullets. The irony was not lost on anti-imperialists at home. "It appears, gentlemen," quipped Williams Jennings Bryan, soon after news of the Philippine war reached the States, "that our destiny is not as manifest as it was two weeks ago."[25]

The Philippine-American war gave tutelage on the ground a troubled tone. Even as the war waned and as most revolutionaries surrendered, other revolutionaries persisted in the hills and in the countryside. Furthermore, the threat of a renewed uprising remained ever-present, and Filipino elites did not hesitate to use the threat against their American mentors. The result was a politics of patronage and concession. Whenever the Americans proceeded too swiftly or openly against the elites' political and socioeconomic power, the elite in turn conjured the specter of revolution, and the

[21] *Annual Report of the Governor of Guam*, 1901, p. 14 (Unpublished ms., USNA, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Record Group 80, microfilm no. 181).

[22] "Annual Report of Brig. Gen. W.A. Kobbe" in *Annual Reports of the War Department* 1900, vol. 3, p. 269.

[23] Quoted in Donna Amoroso, "Inheriting the 'Moro Problem': Muslim Authority and Colonial Rule in British Malaya and the Philippines," in Go and Foster, eds. *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, p. 136.

[24] "Report of the Governor of the Moro Province" in *Report of the Philippine Commission* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 3-4.

[25] Williams Jennings Bryan, "What Next?" *New York Journal*, Feb. 12, 1899.

Americans had to retract. Facing the threat, American authorities could not easily dismantle the elites' entrenched position, nor could they discipline and democratize to the degree they had initially hoped. To make matters worse, the American authorities did not obtain the necessary legislation from Congress at home. They had initially hoped for economic policies that would help fund developmental projects, but Congress, working from its own interests, failed to enact them. This too fed the politics of patronage and concession: in order to fund their developmental projects in the absence of proper Congressional legislation, American authorities had to enact new taxation policies that were dependent upon the full cooperation of the Filipino elite. In exchange for that cooperation, the Americans had to maintain rather than undermine the Filipino elites' traditional political power.[26] This contributed to the creation of what Benedict Anderson has called a "cacique democracy" in the Philippines.

Even in Puerto Rico, where the people did not resist American sovereignty, the tutelage project ran into trouble. This time the trouble had to do with translation. On the one hand, the Americans announced and enacted the project of teaching the people "self-government" and "democracy," but, on the other, the Puerto Rican elite prior to American occupation had already constructed their own distinct meanings of the categories. The elite had equated democracy with *autonomía*, which in turn meant the unrestrained power of the political elite and single-party rule. By local conception, democracy as *autonomía* meant that the party which best represented the people was the party that should take up the reigns of the state and dole out patronage as party leaders saw fit, regardless of formal legal codes. This was not the kind of democratic self-government that the Americans had hoped to impart, and so they stood befuddled as the Puerto Rican elites accepted tutelary rule but then used the colonial state as a site to cultivate their own patronage power, not as a "school of politics" to be disciplined into the Americans' preferred forms of democratic government. Political education was soon plagued by what the Americans called "political corruption," marking an excess of meaning uncontained by the Americans' tutelary signs.

For their part, the Puerto Rican elite had little sense that they were doing anything wrong. Hadn't the American authorities stated that tutelary rule would bring "self-government"? And didn't self-government mean democracy as *autonomía*, hence single-party rule and patronage? Of course, the Americans, insistent upon giving lessons in what democracy "really" meant, took measures to uproot the elites' corrupt practices. They centralized the state as never before. But this merely created an additional problem. In reaction to the Americans' educating measures, the elite responded with an indignation unprecedented. Seeing in the Americans' measures evidence of a promise betrayed, they soon became disillusioned with tutelary occupation. In fact, while they had initially accepted tutelage on their own cultural terms, and while they had therefore responded positively to it, many began demanding something that they had not demanded from Spain (or from the United States) previously—national independence.[27] These unprecedented calls for independence set the basis for various "terrorist" activities against the United States in later decades. In Puerto Rico, the price paid by the United States for tutelary occupation turned out to be unexpectedly high.

In all, what began as an ambitious attempt to fashion a distinctly benevolent and tutelary empire wound up as an empire like any other—an empire marked by strategies of accommodation and concession forged on the cheap and on the spot; an empire plagued with problems of (mis)translation and local resistance, unexpected indignance and unwanted violence. The Americans at the turn of the century had indeed "gone out upon the seas" (as Wilson put it) to extend American power abroad, but what they found there was the limit of power's reach. ■

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[26] J. Go, "Chains of Empire, Projects of State: Political Education and US Colonial Rule in Puerto Rico and the Philippines," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 2 (2000): 333-362.

[27] J. Go, *Transcultured States: Elite Political Culture and US Colonialism in Puerto Rico and the Philippines*; for the same translation issues in the Philippines, see J. Go, "Colonial Reception and Cultural Reproduction: Filipino Elite Response to US Colonial Rule," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 12, no. 4 (1999): 337-68.

The strength and durability of the Chinese empire may well have depended on some recognition of its limitations and the core's interest in the material success of its peripheries. To create a plausible parallel today for America's "empire," we might want to see an ability to rethink the logic of negotiations between political actors over interests and beliefs in ways that allowed those in subordinate positions to gain greater voice and encouraged those in positions of superiority to take the measure of their limitations and promoted a rethinking of what their interests are in places geographically distant but politically central to their exercise of power. To the extent that this seems highly implausible, we can appreciate how different the strategies of empire in Chinese history have been from the political principles and policies that can even be imagined, let alone promoted, in today's world.

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I & I Interviews Arjun Appadurai

Beginning in January 2004, Arjun Appadurai will assume the position of provost and senior vice president for academic affairs at New School University. The author or editor of nine books and more than 80 scholarly papers, Appadurai has been a key figure in analyzing the phenomenon of globalization. He is a former SSRC Board member and long-time friend of the Council, and he agreed to an interview with Items and Issues *to share with us his thinking on the eve of an important transition both in his life and at the New School. In the following comments he covers much terrain: from the challenges facing higher education, to social science post-September 11, to his long-standing admiration for the New School and his "administrative turn."*

I & I: Talk to us, if you would, about what are increasingly characterized as transformations occurring in higher education, both in the US and globally.

A.A.: There is no question that there is a distinct set of transformations that are challenging higher education both here in the US and globally. One that many people have noted involves the growth of institutions that are not in the traditional sense higher education institutions but which are doing parts of the job higher education used to do. Some of the tasks of the university have been outsourced, so to speak, not by the university but by society. An example of this is the tremendous growth in credentialing by non-university organizations for a host of purposes. In the old days the military was a major place that did credentialing outside the university framework, but now, for example, Microsoft offers its whole set of exams and certifications that people not only in the US but abroad aspire to take, and through them to move forward socially and otherwise. Examples of these are legion.

There is also is the increased blurring of the lines between universities and corporations, especially where high-value technical knowledge is involved. In the last 10 to 15 years we've moved well beyond the question of corporate funding for specific kinds of research—especially for the sciences—to partnerships which blur the line and do not let us know where the university stops and the corporation begins.

Many missions of the university—teaching, training, knowledge production, research—have first of all been outsourced and second disaggregated, so that for example teaching and researching are somewhat separated and training has been disaggregated from real teaching. This has created or reinforced deep doubts about whether the massive investment in universities is justified. And we now see these doubts among private donors, foundations, legislatures and ordinary people. What seems to survive this deepening skepticism—because the question is what do you do that others don't do perfectly well—is the role of universities, especially the top universities, as mechanisms for sifting candidates for a kind of cultural super elite. The risk here is that the democratic function and the pragmatic function, in the Dewey sense, of creating literate and liberal citizens through the university are now not at all clear. We need to ask again how universities are speaking to their historical role as places where people learn to be informed, critical, literate citizens of a democratic society.

The second challenge that I see is something more specific and more internal to higher education: that is the growing gap between what can be called a tenured professoriate and the untenured or proletarian professoriate in its myriad forms. This is not only a feature of certain kinds of universities, or of public universities, or of poorly funded universities, or of community colleges. It is an utterly vital and a critical part of the functioning political economy of all our universities including our biggest, our wealthiest universities that rely on a very large staff who go by various titles but are simply not tenured. This opens of course the question of what tenure itself might and ought to mean—that's an old debate. But I think we have now a new context for the debate: how long can a large, complex US higher education system function with a shrinking group of life-long, secure employees and a mass army of others, though themselves internally differentiated, who are employed on other terms to do teaching and in some instances to do research. That is a major question that everybody has to address and tackle together.

We need to ask again how universities are speaking to their historical role as places where people learn to be informed, critical, literate citizens of democracy.

On the global side, we have two striking things: One is that we clearly have a high level of student traffic between the US and other parts of the world and in both directions, though obviously there are important issues about visas and other complexities of entry after the events of September 11, 2001. But on the whole, I think the numbers are going up and certainly a very large number of liberal arts colleges and universities are aggressively seeking to internationalize their student body as part of the older commitment or interest in diversity and a newer one in globalization. So I think we have a large amount of student traffic in both directions but this is not matched—and here's the challenge—by a curriculum that's as multi-perspectival, plural, as interactive and as

dynamic as the actual traffic between student bodies that's occurring on these campuses. The curriculum is, if you like, behind the sociology of traffic among students in the US and overseas.

Another big challenge is that though there is also a quite high global traffic in scholars and intellectuals from all over the world going to other parts of the world, including the US, this traffic is not having any really measurable or notable effect on teaching and training institutions in many countries outside the US and Europe. Africa is perhaps the most notorious example of this gap. But I think it is true to some extent in many other parts of the world. In short, there is a lot of contact and a lot of circulation of intellectuals, scholars and academics, but the trickle down to the strengthening of national and regional institutions in other parts of world, as opposed to the enriching of American and to some extent European institutions, is weak and I think this is a capacity building issue that's a major challenge.

I & I: The traffic that you cite here—there is fragmentary evidence that, post 9/11 and with increased securitization, there actually have been decreases both in the interchange of students and scholars attending international conferences…..

A.A.: There is no question that more individuals have been experiencing some sort of difficulty, notably including students with full funding to the US who are sometimes turned down for visas with no attempt to give reasons—even no security case—simply some kind of triage, which is quite mysterious. And there is the more immediate issue of airport-based scrutiny that is making travel difficult. What I am not sure about is whether this has had a significant net effect on the number of people who are coming to give lectures, or who are able to come to teach for a semester or a year, or sometimes even to take permanent positions. I have yet to see good evidence. But I still see quite a bit of movement, at least from the conferences, events and institutions of which I am aware. And we have every reason to believe that this interchange will continue unless the general progress of the world in terms of peace and the US's role in the world deteriorates to such a highly militarized situation that all of this is going to go into a downward spiral. But I am a professional optimist and also realize that in that case, of course, we are in a crisis much, much bigger than the ones we are talking about.

I & I: What lurks here is the example of another era of globalization during the 19th century, though on a much smaller scale, that was reversed by protectionism, restrictions on movement, xenophobia, WWI....

A.A.: It is true that we have every reason not to be complacent but even the last few weeks show us that various organized forms of dissent from policies of closure are fairly strong. But we also know that the forces that are allied on the side



of closure are not weak. So I think it wise not to presume that the open dimensions of American democracy are always bound to triumph.

I & I: What implications do you see in these developments for the social sciences?

A.A.: Just picking up from our discussion of security, militarization, restriction of movement, possible growth of xenophobia, I think one has to say that there is a renewed need for dialogue with the disciplines of history, linguistics, language studies, anthropology—what we used to call area studies. I think it is perfectly clear that there is a great need for these studies, minus, of course, the antiquarianism, parochialism and sometimes the Orientalism of some of their old paradigms. I think now we are well equipped and quite alert to those dangers. But it is the baby that I am concerned about—I think we disposed of the bath water pretty well. We only have to look at Iraq, for example, to see two things. One is the US government's flurry of urgency regarding the languages of Central Asia, of Iraq and Iran in particular, and so on, leading to a rush of interest from Title VI and Washington at large—a kind of demand-based panic that is replacing an older tradition of steadfast investment in these things. Two, in the wake of 9/11 and Iraq there has been a serious interest in exploring, as social scientists, the complex sources of anti-Americanism in many parts of the world. I am delighted at this. But, I see it as being as a dead end enterprise unless you have deep scholarship about these places. Quick efforts to survey public opinion on these matters, such as the Pew surveys, are useful, will certainly tell you what is happening

at the tip of the iceberg. But they never tell you what the iceberg is actually generating underneath. I think we need to insist that in the world we are now surely in, social science minus strong areas studies is going to be weak.

There is a second implication for social science, which is a need for more active engagement with the public sphere to achieve several ends. One is to provide some counterpoint to the extremely casual, imperfect and even willfully one-sided expertise with which, for example, the Iraq war was undertaken. It's transparent that with Iraq the knowledge base was not only weak but actually bad. So it is not just that we need to have such knowledge (and in fact such knowledge may be available), but we need advocacy. We need to know how to *speak* to those who are making these decisions; and frankly it is not only a matter of speaking, it is a matter of being able to mobilize public debate. That goes beyond taking public policy seriously. It means being willing to enter the public sphere in debate in whatever fora are appropriate so that we don't, as a nation, as the US, have adventures in other parts of the world that turn out to be based on extremely peculiar, limited, distorted ideas about the nature of societies, their resilience, their weakness, their ability to reproduce democracy or not.

We also need more robust traffic inside the university between the social sciences and fields where public concerns are tackled, such as law, medicine, public health, public policy. And a more active dialogue with public policy can also help us to counter what is still, I think, the growing prestige as well a hidden parochialism of formal models in the harder social sciences on the one hand—such as economics and politics, and to some extent demography and some of the related science on that side—and on the other hand a kind of discursive narcissism in parts of anthropology, cultural studies, linguistic studies and so on. Both of these trends I think tend to alienate, to exclude. So, I think this is a second benefit from social science's engagement with public policy: that it might have the effect of pulling away from these two somewhat hermetic tendencies.

The last implication for the social sciences is that we need a serious effort to explore data sets, methodologies, models and techniques which are free of the implicit architecture of the nation state. Many scholars have pointed out that a lot of our methods, models, techniques rest on national data sets, inter*national* comparison, and so on and so forth. Though this has been pointed out from time to time, I don't think a full scale effort has been launched to say how we can build transnational, cross-regional data, how we can develop methods of large-scale comparison which are not implicitly about comparisons between countries. I think this is absolutely urgent and actually it is the most intellectually daunting of the challenges. But without it, we will tend to remain a social science that is global and international in its aspirations but caged in by methodological and archival presumptions that are totally nationalized. This problem has to be tackled.

I & I: Some of our readers may be surprised to learn of your administrative turn. Yet New School University seems like an excellent fit. What resonances are there between your long-term interests and the tradition and mission of the school?

A.A.: I regard this turn in my own life as somewhat dramatic in the sense that I was very much in a position to contribute to my research environment in a very supportive setting at Yale, as before in Chicago, and before that at the University of Pennsylvania. And so, on the face of it, it certainly seems unusual to be shifting my center of gravity to take on a substantial position of administrative responsibility. But this change is a bit more apparent than real because there are some of us who throughout their academic careers have actually been engaged in various kinds of administrative, organizational, institution-building activities—often dispersed, often ephemeral and often very context-bound, so they don't always add up, but certainly in terms of time and effort I like to think I belong to that group of people who do some of the work that allows some of the rest of us to exercise their minds and ideas even more freely and fruitfully. The question at this point in time was whether to continue in that kind of effort or to consolidate some of that energy into a specific institutional location where there was some chance for me to try out what would otherwise be simply criticisms and observations and hopes and wishes. So this turn is—I suppose, wishes seeking to become horses. And I have to say that it is not at all clear to me, given my delight and the profit that I have had in my connections and conversations at Yale, that just any position of this type would have attracted me. The New School has got some very special appeal to it.

Social science needs more active engagement with the public sphere to provide some counterpoint to the extremely casual, imperfect and even willfully one-sided expertise with which, for example, the Iraq war was undertaken.

I actually applied in my last year as an undergraduate to a number of universities including the New School. So I knew about it even as long as 33 years ago. For a variety of reasons, including my financial needs, I ended up very happily going to graduate school at the University of Chicago, but that prior knowledge was further enriched by the traffic between some distinguished members of the New School faculty and their extended New York counterparts who came regularly to the Committee on Social Thought where I was in the

University of Chicago. The most famous of them was Hannah Arendt, with whom I took some very small tutorial courses that had only 4 or 5 students in them on topics like Machiavelli and her lectures on the history of the will. *Completely* remarkable intellectual events, and she was not the only one—there was also Hans Jonas who was at the New School and also came regularly to the University of Chicago. And then some others like Harold Rosenberg, who belonged generally to the progressive political New York City milieu, were also visitors on a regular basis to my end of the University of Chicago. There was, in retrospect, a hidden affinity between my first undergraduate institution in the US, Brandeis, the New School, and my graduate institution: all of them institutions deeply influenced by a dialogue with critical traditions in Europe; all of them touched by the experience of holocaust and exile; all of them universities of the book—great believers in the importance of the text and somehow embedded in the Great Conversation both in the sense of the giants of the recent period as well in terms of the Western tradition.

I have also always retained a high regard for the special commitment of the New School to the democratic project, to a kind of critical place in American public discourse, which it maintains to this date, and for its unique and special interest in recognizing that working adults are very important parts of our educational world, especially in a city like New York. I think the New School had this idea long before other institutions discovered that continuing education was a virtuous and sometimes profitable thing to do.

Thirdly, I think the mid-century character of the New School as a university in exile, as the place that bloomed because it was able to host some of the great minds of Europe who were fleeing Hitler, fleeing the Holocaust, today has a potential for reenacting itself on a global scale because we do have people now moving around, as we said earlier, from many parts of the world—often also escaping from tyrannies or oppressions of various kinds and indeed from suffering. (But sometimes simply moving around because they prefer other places to be.) So I am hoping that the New School may be a place where my own global interests and commitments—at the level of students, at the level of faculty, at the level of the life of the mind itself—might find a special receptivity because it's always been a place oriented to something beyond these national shores, and Bob Kerrey, the president, is deeply interested in linking the kind of American democratic impulse of the New School to a more fully global conversation.

Finally, I think for me two other things are very interesting about the New School apropos what we've been talking about. One, New York City of course is a remarkably complex site of global processes and a site of many kinds of challenges to social science as well as to critical traditions and scholarship and teaching in general. So I think the fact that the New School is in that city affords tremendous opportunities that it has always taken advantage of and I hope it will continue to do so as the city is now rethinking itself after September 11 and wondering what its own future should be like and how it should relate to the rest of the world. It is after all the home of the UN, among other things. It's a remarkably complex public sphere in its own right, and I think it has room for many great and different visions of what the university should be, as we see in NYU, in CUNY, in Columbia and many other New York academic institutions. But I think New School University has a special contribution to make because of its courageous, steadfast, dare I say, unique commitment to justice, to democratic debate, to inclusion, and I think at this moment in the history of the US, perhaps that kind of courage is especially important to support, nurture, and develop.

Lastly, the New School is maybe more known to some than to others not only for a very important strand of social science in its graduate faculty—justly famous—but also as home and host to a variety of other schools, notably the Parsons School of Design, but also the Milano School of Public Policy, the Mannes College of Music, the Jazz and Contemporary Music Program and the Actors' Studio—all of which joined the New School at different points and for different reasons, but today their presence opens up something which I think is an unusual, possibly unique, opportunity, which is to bring questions about the creative life, the performing arts, design, architecture, into a serious, nontrivial dialogue with the social sciences, with philosophy, the liberal arts. I believe this is something which is not available off the shelf and if it can be a global process where we bring in thinkers and makers and doers and critics and intellectuals from different parts of the world to join in that specific effort, which we may call "designing society," if you like, that could be specific contribution that the New School could make now to add to the contributions that it has made in the past. These are the sorts of things that seem to me special and intriguing. But more generally, I suppose it is a chance to continue to help shape responses to the many challenges I have talked about at a university that on the one hand has a strategic location, has a very special history, but also is of a scale that allows for flexibility, for innovation, even for adventure. That is what draws me to this example of the administrative turn. ■

I think New School University has a special contribution to make because of its courageous, steadfast, dare I say, unique commitment to justice, to democratic debate, to inclusion.

Network Creativity and Digital Culture

Since 2000, the Culture, Creativity, and Information Technology Program has explored how digital network technologies and the Internet are changing patterns of cultural participation. Recent work has focused on identifying the emerging, largely impersonal patterns embedded in this cultural reinvention—the structures of participation through which people produce, share, and experience culture, and the new cultural capacities that emerge at the intersection of technological and social innovation. The two essays below, by Geoffrey Bowker and Mizuko Ito, address different aspects of this transformation. Longer versions of each will appear in a forthcoming program-sponsored volume, Network|Netplay: Structures of Participation in Digital Culture *(Joe Karaganis and Natalie Jeremijenko, eds., Duke University Press, 2004).*

The Past and the Internet

By Geoffrey C. Bowker

In the course of human (and non-human) history, it is rare enough for a significant new regime of recording the past to develop. There have been two in the past millenium before the present change: the development of the practices of written record-keeping (Clanchy 1993: 3) and the invention of the printing press (Eisenstein 1979).

What we know about the past has changed dramatically with each such change. The changes run far deeper than the mere proliferation of data points. As written records of large estates held in monasteries in France achieved legal and social dominance, the role of women as the tellers of the past fell into decline (Geary 1994): the technological and the social were deeply intertwined. The outcome was that different kinds of records were kept. With the invention of the printing press, the progenitor of modern computing Charles Babbage proclaimed that until the invention of printing: "the mass of mankind were in many respects almost the creatures of instinct." Now, the great were encouraged to write, knowing that: "they may accelerate the approaching dawn of that day which shall pour a flood of light over the darkened intellects of their thankless countrymen," seeking: "that higher homage, alike independent of space and time, which their memory shall for ever receive from the good and the gifted of all countries and all ages." Since printing, the rate of progress of humanity has "vastly accelerated"; over the past three or four centuries "man, considered as a species, has commenced the development of his intellectual faculties" (Babbage 1837). The language is overblown, but the possibility of conversations across the ages (Landor 1882) through access to table talk in salons as well as philosophical tracts has indeed changed our relationship with the past.

As social scientists engaged with the new technology of the Internet, we are faced with myriad claims about how the present is different and how the future will be reconfigured. However, we rarely think about how our relationship with the past changes with such new technology. In this paper, I claim that a new regime of technologies for holding and shaping past experience has been developed through a process I call databasing the world[1]—and I explore some implications of this new regime for social scientific research.

[1]I am using the word "database" widely here to refer to the set of traces (records, listserves, music and so forth) available and searchable on the Internet. The drive to database the world can be tied back historically to the growth of governmentality (Foucault 1991).

What traces do we leave?

(In which it is argued that we leave a lot of traces)

So where are we today? I rarely think about the traces that I leave in the world as an ecology. I tend to think of them (when at all) quite concretely. Firstly my library. It operates as a form of external memory for me (when I, rarely, use it) and as a commemoration of things I have read. Its probable fate after my death is its dispersal into a hundred homes. Marginal notes that I have written will lower the selling price rather than attract attention. On the web. It is interesting to track dead people on the web. My friends and acquaintances who died before Mosaic (the first Internet browser) are sparsely represented, and when they are it is generally in a classical, canonical academic style (footnote references, bibliographies…). Or in a Mormon database. Those who died more recently carry on a rich afterlife. They often still receive email messages; links to their websites rot very slowly; their informal thoughts are often captured on listserve archives, on comments they have left on a website (signing the visitor's books). Some people even have "eternal flame" websites[2]—where the problem of maintenance is as live as it is for the Olympic torch. Each of these modes of memory was in place before Mosaic, but it is now possible to articulate them in ways that were previously unworkable. It would take a researcher a life time to track down my written traces—where I have signed guestbooks in weird museums and twee hostels, people I have carried on informal correspondence with. Those of us enjoying and being irritated by post Mosaic syndrome (PMS), leave legible traces across a wide range of our activities in electronic form. Everyone their own Boswell.

When I, rarely, think about the articulation of the set of traces that I am leaving, I have the immediate apprehension that it's not the real me that's out there on the web. I know the times when I've censored myself (oh problematic concept!) and when I have performed actions to complement—and frequently to confound—a trace. Thus I might write a positive review of a friend's book and then offer close colleagues a different reading.

Taken globally, the set of traces that we leave in the world does without doubt add up to something. It is through

[2]http://www.venus.co.uk/gordonpask/

operations on sets of traces that I understand an event that I take part in. Tolstoy wrote about the foot soldier in the Napoleonic wars. The soldier he describes cannot have the experience of the war he is waging nor the battle he is fighting because the only "global" traces of the war are inscriptions—notably maps and statistics. There is no scaleable observation that moves from "I was in a copse hiding behind a tree and was terribly confused" to "I took part in Napoleon's bold attack on Uvarov's flank." In this case, where is the "experience" of the war? When we experience a war, we are reliant on the aggregations of other experience to ground and shape our experience.

In general, we use scientific representational forms to fashion our experience.

With digital archiving in all its forms, however, a new regime of technologies for holding past experience has emerged. Our past has always been malleable, but now it is malleable with a new viscosity. Where in the past our experiences were frequently (literally!) pigeon-holed into rigid classification systems, leading to a relative paucity of tales we could tell about our past, today the traces have multiplied and the rigid classifications are withering. (Who now does a "tree" search through the web using Yahoo categories in preference to the random access mode of Google?) New forms of governmentality, based on holding knowledge about the past, are emerging in which the map and the statistic become the prime instruments for governing the territory. It is not that we have the ability to aggregate brute numbers—that has been available since the early nineteenth century at least in a number of domains (notably the insurance industry). It is rather that we can aggregate that data along multiple different dimensions, and perform complex operations over that set of dimensions. It is the pleats and the folds of our data rather than their number which constitute their texture. There is a new, rich interiority accompanying the faster global exchange of information and people. I have access to my fleeting thoughts of previous years in my Eudora outboxes—all carefully kept since memory is so cheap today (contrast the scrap books of previous generations). My subconscious and unconscious vie in what could be called my "paraconscious": the massive sets of traces of my past that I have randomly accessible to me.



One Million Years - Post, 1970-71, Volume VI: 498300 BC, pp. 1100/1101

The Promise of the Searchable Database

In Eugene Sue's *Le Juif Errant* (Sue and Gavarni 1845) two memory regimes are pitted against each other—the Wandering Jew, who tracks his family and its fortune by remaining incessantly awake; and the Jesuits, who track the same family and fortune across the centuries through extremely efficient record-keeping practices. The problem with personal memory and records is that there needs to be an act of recording: either Ahasuerus must have a memory trace in his brain or the Jesuits need to write their secret reports and file them efficiently. One read on the current set of memory practices is that we are moving culturally from the era of recorded memory to that of potential memory. There are so many, and multiply determined traces out there on the web, and they are so easily searchable, that any given individual (this is the virtue of the commons) does not have to worry so much about collecting his or her own books and films, annotating them, jotting down obscure facts and quotes on index cards, memorizing genealogies. It's all out there, should I need it at any time. And it's truly random access.

If I am caught on a recondite reference in *The New York Times* Saturday crossword I certainly don't need to rack my brains as I might once have done, or search sequentially through several dictionaries and encylopedias: I type in two or three key words and someone somewhere will have written about whatever it is and put it on the web. If I want to remember (as I have) the name of a childhood friend, then I don't need to call up my ever unreliable brother—I find it on the web.

Recall the optimism of Aldous Huxley (Huxley 1963) that with due attention to spirituality and drug ingestion one could recover all those lost traces and enjoy the total memory that our brains record. In a sense now I have this available to me because a lot of other people are endlessly writing, recording, putting online. A few points about this activity though. First is that my potential memory is so great partly because I am white, bourgeois, male, academic and British: my set of traces is much more likely to have been covered by these effectively random acts of recording than those of a Camerounian avocado farmer. In the welter of data, it is hard often to remember how remorselessly culturally weighted the Internet is. Second is that this random access potential memory is culturally central. Ants seem collectively to be intelligent because they individually leave an inordinate number of chemical traces in their environment: the environment itself is altered such that a stupid ant can still find food. Similarly, as Halbwachs argued (Halbwachs 1968), we configure our physical environment to act as a constant aide-mémoire: from the Stations of the Cross in a church to the architecture of our offices. Now we have a past which is much more, and in many more ways, present in our lives—and this changes who we are, what we think and what we can say.

So what difference does it make?
(in which it is argued "a lot")

Historians refer to the period 1920-1980 as the lost years. During those years, a lot of schmoozing, conferring, and deal-cutting was done over the phone, with no trace being left for the sorry chronicler—who was forced into semiotic analysis of recondite documents to guess real motivations for a given action. In the nineteenth century this was not the case—there was so much use of letters; and postal delivery was so much more regular. Thus if I want to know about Charles Babbage's real reasons for writing his awful *Ninth Bridgewater Treatise* (a paean to the emerging computer as a metaphor for God's action on earth), I can go to his correspondence with John Herschell and Charles Lyell—frequently several letters a day. In the lost years, the restrained astronomer and geologist would have called Babbage on the phone and pummelled him orally a lot more than they would have written.

So in a very simple sense, the world is a better place for historians now. However, it's still not a great place. The recent Microsoft trial is a good guide for why it's not. Microsoft was hurt during the deliberations by the seizing of internal email correspondence, which had been pretty explicit about their brutal business methods for assuring hegemon Gates his power base. After a series of similar actions, companies started springing up offering products to completely clean disks of all traces of correspondence. Merely erasing the messages is not enough (they might still be there as information blocks which a hacker could get into) and shredding hard disks (the DARPA option) is expensive and a little silly. So now there is Secure Delete, "the digital document shredder." Companies are now generally aware of the need to destroy and massage their email, much as they have destroyed and massaged paper records over the centuries.

And yet, there is a real difference with the current technology. It is so easy to leave and to assemble traces, that we are developing a kind of universal prosthetic memory. That memory creates profound differences in our consciousness and in our work practices: all which had been fleeting or consigned to a folder itself consigned to dust is now, should we wish, active and present in our lives.

The past, L.P. Hartley wrote, is a strange land—they do things differently there. What we are witnessing is not a cultural shift from no memory (the lost years) to good memory (after the Internet) but from memory practices marked by written and oral communication to memory practices marked by electronic and oral communication. The distinction is important. When network technologies come on the scene, the ecology of storytelling and record-keeping changed fundamentally. Clanchy remarks that it took about two hundred years in Europe to move from putting trust in written documents over trusted witnesses with memories. There were just too many ways to forge documents in the old days, until the invention of practices like the chirograph (the tearing of a document in half, with the agreement reproduced on both halves). It took a few hundred years for footnotes to develop. It took a hundred years to move from a recognized need to make documents to a recognized need to store them (the invention of the archive).

We are currently undergoing just such a slow and just such a dramatic shift in our relationship with the past. Its final results are unclear—the "save everything" mentality of the early days has already been replaced by the "save the minimal legal set" mentality of many companies and individuals today. At the same time we are exploring new genres for keeping people and events live on the Internet long after their respective ends.

The really important shift that I see occurring is in the way of storing and accessing the past and its knowledge. The encyclopedists in the eighteenth century and the great classifiers of the nineteenth figured knowledge as a relatively stable edifice, built out of relatively standard bricks. The grand overviews of knowledge and hierarchical orderings of knowledge they gave us have generally crumbled. Now we are freed from the technological underpinnings of their beliefs—that is to say, we are no longer forced to engage in the same sets of orderings of the knowledge and events from the past in order to encompass huge data sets.

Social scientists have in general been loath to study information infrastructures—the record itself has seemed secondary to the story that the record could yield. And yet, when new methods of record-keeping are emerging which radically alter our relationship with the past, it behooves us to explore the possibilities and limitations of our new infrastructure. Finally, with so much of our social gaze directed at the future possibilities of the new technology (databasing species to preserve biodiversity; producing a world encyclopedia; realizing the nightmare of a surveillance society), we as social scientists need to draw attention to and seek ways to understand the ways in which our very relationship with the past is quietly being reconfigured—and with revolutionary effect. ■

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Technologies of the Childhood Imagination: Media Mixes, Hypersociality, and Recombinant Cultural Form

By Mizuko Ito

From 1998-2002, I conducted fieldwork in Tokyo among children, parents, and media industrialists. One focus of my work was *Yugioh*, the wildly successful Japanese *anime* (cartoon) and *manga* (comic) series, which was a phenomenon among elementary-age boys[1] in Japan from 2000 to 2002 and which is now firmly entrenched in European and American youth culture.

The *Yugioh* comic series has spawned a television cartoon, an immensely popular card game, over ten different video game versions, and character goods ranging from T-shirts to packaged curry to pencil boxes, all of which manifest the *Yugioh* imagination across multiple sites of consumption, play, spectatorship, and social action. *Yugioh* is an example of a "media mix" of the type pioneered by *Pokemon*, integrating different media forms through licensed character content.

One survey in 2000 of three hundred students in a Kyoto elementary school indicated that, by the third grade, every student owned some *Yugioh* cards (*Asahi Shinbun* 2001). The *Yugioh* cartoon was released in the US in 2001, and now the card game has overtaken *Pokemon* here in popularity. *Pokemon* was a breakthrough media form in positioning the strategies and narrative of a video game as fodder for serialized, non-interactive forms of media (TV, *manga*) as well as relying on portable and intimate technologies (Game Boy, playing cards) that enabled kids to perform these narratives in diverse settings of social interaction (Allison 2002). *Yugioh* similarly relies on virtual game play as the focal object of serialized narratives enacted in digital, analog, and everyday sites of play.

Here I use the case of *Yugioh* as a way of exploring emergent technologies of the imagination, i.e., how certain social conditions and cultural forms of childhood are tied to newly pervasive media technologies. Like Benedict Anderson (1991) and Arjun Appadurai (1996a), I see the imagination as a "collective social fact," built on the spread of certain media technologies at particular historical junctures (Appadurai 1996a, 5). Appadurai has argued that the circulation of mass electronic media has defined a role for the imagination that is more integrated with the everyday lives of ordinary people. He also posits that people are engaging with these imaginings in more agentive, mobilized, and selective ways, as part of the creation of new kinds of collective identifications, or "communities of sentiment." (1996a, 6-8). "The imagination is today a staging ground for action, and not only for escape" (1996a: 7). My focus is on the more recent technologies of networked digital media and how they are further inflected toward ubiquitous, activist, and customized engagements with a technologized imaginary. More specifically, this essay describes the imaginary of *Yugioh* as built upon media mixing as technical form, *hypersociality* as social form, and *remix* as cultural form.

The Media Mix

In the past decade, study of digital culture has increasingly recognized that the "virtual world" of the Internet is a site of "real" politics, identities, and capital rather than a dematerialized realm of free-flowing information (for example, Castronova 2001; Hine 2000; Lessig 1999; Lovink 2003; Miller and Slater 2000; Rheingold 2002). The media mix insists that we also recognize the inverse flow: the real is being colonized by the virtual as technologies of the digital imagination become more pervasive in the everyday environment. *Yugioh* and an ecology of pervasive digital technology in urban Japan are indicative of this porous membrane between the real and virtual, the imagination and everyday life. Through dramatic competition between players, fantastic creatures manifest in the everyday world with more and more fidelity through advancing virtual, or augmented[2] reality technologies; familiar settings in the urban landscape are transformed. In the *manga*, duels become vividly life-like through "duel disks" worn on the players' arms that project the monsters in vivid holographic 3D. Virtual monsters inflict bodily damage on real life duelists as they blast the playing field with dragon fire and destructive magic.

Yugioh is similar to the media mixes of *Pokemon* and *Digimon* in that they involve human players who mobilize other-worldly monsters in battle. Unlike *Digimon* and *Pokemon*, however, the monsters in *Yugioh* inhabit the everyday world of Yugi and his peers in the form of trading cards that the players carry with them in their ongoing adventures. The "other world" of the monsters is in intimate relationship with the everyday; the human players in the *manga* mobilize monsters in their everyday world, and kids in "real life" mobilize these same monsters in their play with trading cards and Game Boys. The activities of children in our world thus closely mimic the activities and materialities of children in Yugi's world. They collect and trade the same cards and engage in play with the same strategies and rules. Scenes in the *anime* depict Yugi frequenting card shops and

[1] Although some girls engage with *Yugioh*, it was decisively marked as boys' content, unlike *Pokemon*. I don't have space to describe a case of a girls' media mix, and consequently, the topic of gender difference. But I would like to note that, like most kinds of technology-oriented media cultures, the trends in *anime* media mixes are being set by boys' media and filtering over to girls'.

[2] Virtual reality is a term that gained currency in the early nineties as a way of describing immersive, computer generated virtual environments that a user "entered" through technologies such as stereoscopic goggles and instrumented gloves. Augmented reality is a more recent term describing technologies such as see-through displays that juxtapose digital images and real-world objects and environments.

buying card packs, enjoying the thrill of getting a rare card, dramatizing everyday moments of media consumption in addition to the highly stylized and fantastic dramas of the duels themselves.

While the intertextual dynamics of media mixing have existed for as long as people have transcribed oral narratives or dramatized written ones, contemporary versions do have unique qualities. They go beyond the more familiar form of adaptation between one media form and another, as when a movie is made with the characters of a prior book or video game. With *Yugioh*, multiple media forms *concurrently* manifest an evolving but shared virtual referent of fantasy game play and collection. And unlike earlier forms of card play, *Pokemon* and *Yugioh* cards are tied to an immense narrative apparatus of *anime* and *manga* series spanning multiple years, as well as digital game play. Cards and card decks are marketed based on their association with particular *anime* characters and episodes, and the Game Boy and Play Station games reproduce the *anime* narrative. Conversely, players can input the codes on the physical cards to make those same cards manifest in Game Boy games, to play against their friends or characters in the *anime* series. The media mix is a heterogeneous but integrated web of reference manifesting in multiple material forms.

Hypersociality

In addition to manifesting the imagination in everyday life through teeming media technologies, media mixes also change the positioning of the media consumer. Far from the shut-in behavior that gave rise to the most familiar forms of anti-media rhetoric, this media mix of children's popular culture is wired, extroverted and hypersocial, sociality augmented by a dense set of technologies, signifiers, and systems of exchange. The image of solitary kids staring at television screens and twiddling their thumbs has given way to the figure of the activist kid beaming monsters between Game Boys, trading cards in the park, text messaging friends on their bus ride home, and reading breaking *Yugioh* information emailed to a mobile phone. This digitally-augmented sociality is an unremarkable fact of life now to the current generation of kids in urban Japan. Now that the majority of Japan accesses the Internet through mobile phones and Game Boys are becoming the preferred platform for game play, computer and TV screens are no longer privileged access points to the virtual and the networked world.

Congregating with their Game Boys and *Yugioh* playing cards, kids engage in a form of hypersocial exchange that is pervaded by the imagination of virtual gaming worlds. Emitting a palpable buzz of excitement, a group of boys huddle in a corner of their after-school center, trading cards, debating the merits of their decks, and talking about the latest TV episode. A little girl rips open a pack of cards at a McDonald's, describing their appeal to her baffled grandparents. A boy wears a favorite rare card around his neck as he climbs the play equipment at the park, inciting the envy and entrepreneurism of his peers. As their mother completes her grocery shopping, a brother and sister walk into an elevator dueling with coupled Game Boy Advance machines. When *Yugioh* players get together (hyper)social exchange involves both the discursive sharing of stories and information, as well as the material exchange of playing cards and virtual monsters.

The imagination of *Yugioh* pervades the everyday settings of childhood as it is channeled through these portable and intimate media forms. These forms of play are one part of a broader set of shifts towards intimate and portable technologies that enable lightweight imaginative sharing between people going about their everyday business. These include trading cards, portable game devices, an extensive range of "character goods" that display characters like Yugi on food, clothing, and school supplies, as well as multimedia mobile phones that capture and exchange visual as well as textual information (Ito 2003; Okabe and Ito 2003). The imagination is now more than ever part of the semiotics of everyday social life.

Remix and Revaluation

Rather than a one-way street connoted by the term mass media or mass culture, hypersocial exchange is about active, differentiated, and entrepreneurial consumer positions and a high degree of media and technical literacy. This builds on the sensibilities of kids that grew up with the interactive and layered formats of video games as a fact of life, bringing this subjectivity to bear on other media forms. Players build a personalized relationship to this content by collecting their own set of cards and virtual monsters and combining them into a deck or battle team that reflects a unique style of play. *Pokemon* decisively inflected video game culture towards personalization and recombination, demonstrating that chil-

dren can master highly esoteric content, customization, remixing, and a pantheon of hundreds of characters. These more challenging forms of play have also attracted a wide following of adults.

Like most popular forms of *anime* content, *Yugioh* has an avid following of adult fans, often labeled by the Japanese term for media geek, "otaku" (Napier 2000). Adult *otaku* communities are the illegitimate offspring of the *Yugioh* media empire, and are in an uneasy relationship with the entertainment industries that create *Yugioh* content. They exploit gaps in dominant systems of meaning and mainstream commodity capitalism, mobilizing tactics that are a thorn in the side of those relying on mass marketing and distribution. With the advent of the Internet, *otaku* communities found their medium, an organizing ground for special interest fan communities and a site for distribution of alternative content and grey market goods. For example, comic artists intervene in the symbolic and economic exchange of *Yugioh* by creating zines that depict liaisons such as those between a feminized Yugi romantically coupled with his card-duel rival, a gently domineering Kaiba. They sell their glossy productions on the Internet and at Comic Market, the largest "trade" show in Japan, which brings together 300,000 fans twice a year. Cultural remix is about the appropriation and reshaping of mass cultural content as well as its revaluation through alternative economies and systems of exchange.

Card *otaku* are also considered a threat to normalized capitalist relations. As atomized and commodified offspring of an empire of the imagination, trading cards invite unique economies of exchange. *Yugioh* cards have been released in a variety of forms, including ready-to-play packs, vending machine versions, and limited release versions packaged with Game Boy software, in books, and distributed at trade shows. The most common form of purchase is in five card packs costing ¥150 (just over $1). A new series of these five card packs is released every few months. When purchasing a pack of cards, one doesn't know what one will get within the fifty or so cards in a series. Most card packs have only "normal" run of the mill cards, but if you are lucky you may get a "rare," "super rare," "ultra rare," or perhaps even an "ultimate rare" card in one of your packs.

One kind of *otaku* knowledge is known as *sa-chi* or "searching." These are methods by which card collectors identify rare card packs *before* purchase. Collectors meet to make the rounds of convenience stores. They share tips and techniques, and eventually post them to web sites that traffic in cards. I find myself out at 1 AM with a group of card collectors, pawing through three boxes of just released cards. The salesperson is amused but slightly annoyed, and it takes some negotiating to get him to open all three boxes. My companions pride themselves on their well-trained fingertips and disciplined vision that enables them to identify the key card packs. They teach me a few tricks of the trade, but clearly this is a skill born of intensive practice. After identifying all the rare, super rare, and ultra rare cards in the store, they head out to clear the other neighborhood shops of rare cards before daybreak, when run-of-the-mill consumers will start purchasing.

Single cards, often purchased in these ways, are sold at card shops and on the Internet. In city centers in Tokyo such as Shibuya, Ikebukuro, and Shinjuku, there are numerous hobby shops that specialize in the buying and selling of single cards, and which are frequented by adult collectors as well as children. These cards can fetch prices ranging from pennies to hundreds of dollars for special edition cards. Street vendors and booths at carnivals will also often have a display of single-sale *Yugioh* cards that children flock to. Internet auction sites and *Yugioh* web sites, however, mediate the majority of these player-to-player exchanges. The total volume is extremely large. One collector I spoke to purchases about 600 packs of cards in each round of searches and could easily make his living buying and selling *Yugioh* cards.

Children share the same active and entrepreneurial stance, cultural fascinations, and interests as the adult gamers, but they lack the same freedom of motion and access to money and information. The rumor mill among children is active though often ill informed. All the children that I spoke with about it had heard of search techniques, and some even had some half-baked ideas of how it might be done. Children create their own local rules, hierarchies of values, and micro-economies among peer groups, trading, buying, and selling cards in ways that mimic the more professional adult networks. Despite adult crackdowns on trading and selling between children, it is ubiquitous among card game players. Once mobile phones filter down from the teen to the elementary-aged demographic, these exchanges are likely to be central to an expanded range of communications between kids, exchanging information, beaming character jpegs and cutting deals during their down-time hours in transit and at home in the evenings.

Technologies of the Imagination

The backchannel discourse of the card *otaku* is the mostly unsung but often performed story of *Yugioh* as a case of new economy commodity capitalism and of an entrepreneurial, extroverted, and wired childhood. Unlike spectacular narratives of good and evil told on the TV screen, the buzz of competitive exchange between kids in the park, the furtive rounds of collectors in the night, and the flow of cards and monsters through Internet commerce and street-level exchange point to a peer-to-peer imaginary that is heterogeneously materialized and produced through highly distributed social practices. The imaginary of *Yugioh* refuses to be contained within the sanctioned networks and contact points of mainstream industrialists marketing hegemonic narratives to supposedly passive masses of children. Portable, intimate, and personalized digital media (described in the technology world with terms such as augmented reality or ubiquitous, mobile, and pervasive computing) couple with

emergent changes in the way we affiliate, organize, and imagine. While the Internet has stolen center stage in our theorizing of new forms of communication and relationality, media mixes in children's content, operating below the radar of adult society, have been quietly radicalizing a new generation's relationship to culture and social life.

The media mix for Japanese children is certainly an uncommonly technologized and phantasmagoric social site, but it does suggest a differently inflected research imaginary for those of us who study media technology. My effort in this brief essay has not been to suggest that we have seen a decisive shift in technologies of the imagination, but rather to evoke an emergent research imaginary tied to new technologies and practices of a rising generation. Just as electronic media and globalization have forced a re-reading of more traditional social scientific concepts such as place and locality (eg., Appadurai 1996b; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Meyrowitz 1985), media mixing invites attention to social and cultural processes in media both old and new. Media mixing involves attention to a highly distributed and pervasive imaginary that spans multiple material forms, an imaginary that is massive, but not mass. In addition to an analysis of the relation *between* reality and text, production and consumption, media mixing also demands that we query the relation between differently materialized and located texts, exploring issues of intertextuality, multiple materialities, and a distributed field of cultural production. Perhaps most importantly, the media mix demands a continued attentiveness to the politics, productivity, and creativity of the everyday, as technologies of the imagination populate even the most mundane corners of our daily lives. ■

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Online

Address http://edtransitions.ssrc.org/home.aspx

On December 5, 2003, the SSRC Education Program launched the Transitions to College project's website: "Transitions to College: From Theory to Practice." The Program's goal is to build an on-line multi-disciplinary and multi-media resource center for students, scholars and practitioners working on transition issues. The site includes records of journal articles, reports, policy briefs and other materials. Registered users may search these records and add to them. The project's committee members may use the site to post and amend their in-process work for the project, as well as add citations, websites, conferences and events that relate to our project's mission. The site also features a bulletin board of public events and fellowship opportunities and an extensive list of websites relevant to transitions to college.

This site is an experiment: an attempt to build a virtual research tool for a highly diverse set of users that reside in very different kinds of intellectual locations, with direct input from those users. We also hope that it will provide an interesting model for a virtual workspace that will increase the efficiency and quality of our work by allowing committee members to communicate easily with each other and with the SSRC staff.

Abe Fellowship Program

Internet Governance and US Intelligence

The Abe Fellowship Program hosted a Brown-Bag Lunch on October 14 at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. Abe Fellow Motohiro Tsuchiya ('02), International University of Japan, spoke on "Internet Governance and the US Intelligence Establishment." Tadamasa Kimura, Waseda University, was the commentator. Tsuchiya outlined the far-reaching effects on the Internet of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. According to Tsuchiya, the Patriot Act threatens the efforts of the American internet community to keep cyber space free from official control. The conflict over information—freedom vs. regulation—was discussed at length. Tsuchiya saw the issue firsthand in 2001 when his fieldwork in Washington, DC, was disrupted by the anthrax attack on Capitol Hill.

Women's Economic Role and Marriage

The Abe Fellowship Program held a colloquium June 9 on "Women's Economic Role and Marriage: Where Does Japan Stand?" at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, Tokyo. Abe Fellow Hiromi Ono, University of Michigan, was the presenter. Akiko Nagai, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Research on Household Economics, was discussant and Hiroshi Ishida ('92), University of Tokyo, moderated the meeting. Ono addressed the question: Do women's economic resources prevent marriage formation? According to the universality hypothesis, higher income should reduce women's chance of marriage at a given time in all contexts. The gender-contextual variation hypothesis holds that women's higher economic standing depresses marriage only in countries with a relatively high degree of role differentiation by gender, but encourages marriage in countries with more gender-egalitarian roles. Ono tested the theories with data sets from Japan, the United States, and Sweden; the evidence supported the latter hypothesis for Japan, but not for the other two countries. Ono also examined the incompatibility between women's economic independence and marriage and discussed wives' response to the decline in marital quality in Japan. Lastly, she shared preliminary findings on divorce in relation to marital duration and childbearing. The public policy implications of these finding were debated in a lively Q&A session and reception.

Reception: "Rob Hite: New Paintings and Wall Sculptures"

Over 120 people attended the SSRC's reception and art exhibit opening on September 18, featuring the work of Robert Hite. The exhibit displayed Hite's new paintings and wall sculptures, which continue his aesthetic study of rural houses and habitats. SSRC President Craig Calhoun welcomed guests, and Program Director Eric Hershberg and Rob Hite, joined by his daughter, added to an enjoyable evening with their comments and acknowledgments.

Lisa Collins and Lee Bernstein, professors of art history and American culture, respectively, at Vassar College, describe Hite's work: "Rob's practice of using discarded objects both upholds and extends traditions of recycling and reuse that have by necessity been creative living strategies practiced by the majority of the world's peoples." Recently returned from Latin America, Hite has also exhibited work on Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, southern Spain and the southern US.



"Nightwhistlers House" by Robert Hite

The exhibit is part of the SSRC's outreach efforts and complements the Council's programming and commitment to supporting the role of art in interpreting the human experience. The exhibition program is designed to feature artists whose works offer unique perspectives on social, political, and economic events and conditions around the world. A portion of proceeds from the sale of art will be donated to SSRC programs.

Africa Program

Youth, HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation

The SSRC Africa Program in partnership with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa (NRF) has announced the selection of 13 fellowship recipients of the 2003-4 program for research and training on African Youth in a Global Age. The theme for this year is Youth, HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation.

The fellowship program supports projects that examine the impact of HIV/AIDS on the lives of African youth and the ways in which young people creatively organize and redefine their lives to deal with the pandemic. Research addresses not only the personal and interpersonal dynamics of transmission and infection but also the broader transformations at household, community and institutional levels. Research topics include, but are not limited to the following: youth's sexual ideologies and changing patterns of behavior regarding sexuality and marriage practices; changes in intergenerational relations, households and families (care-giving,

the transfer of knowledge, wealth and social power, AIDS orphans, gender relations); the impact of HIV/AIDS on the educational and healthcare systems in relation to young people (access to schools, training and learning; access to treatment); economic impacts (employment, labor markets, productive capacity); the role of young people in programs related to prevention and care, or in social movements for access to treatment and support; and youth's understandings of local, national or global responses (or lack of them) to their situations. The fellowship puts emphasis on empirical social science research informed by theory and analysis from a wide range of perspectives and disciplines—historical, anthropological, sociological, economic, demographic, public health and others. For more information please go to www.ssrc.org/programs/africa/

Training Workshop

The African Youth in a Global Age Fellowship Program held the second training workshop for its second cohort of fellows on June 20-24, 2003, in Durban, South Africa. The SSRC Africa Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) and South Africa's National Research Foundation jointly sponsored the workshop. The program is supported by a grant from the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, with additional support from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. The workshop, which took place at the Tropicana Hotel in Durban, included 17 fellows as well as resource persons from institutions in Africa and the United States, and NRF and OSISA representatives.

The workshop consisted of presentations by the fellows of their research findings and discussions of conceptual and methodological issues related to youth research, particularly on the theme of "African Youth, NGOs and Civil Society." Presentations by each fellow were followed by intense and engaged discussions with resource persons, other fellows and participants in general.

The conclusion of the workshop also marked a farewell to the African Youth 2002 fellows, who have now concluded their fellowship. We look forward to working with them on possible publication of their work, and to keeping the network going.

AIDS and Social Transformation

On November 24 and 25th, the Council hosted an advisory meeting for the initiative on HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation. Following up on the first meeting held in 2002, participants from a range of international academic, non-governmental, and research institutions convened to help develop the SSRC's projects and programs to foster new social science research on the pandemic. On the agenda were specific conversations about areas where social science research is in shortest supply in informing policy and our understanding of the crisis.

For the opening session, Tony Barnett (London School of Economics) and Alan Whiteside (University of Natal) led a discussion on how HIV/AIDS is threatening development, and the challenges for understanding that impact. Alex de Waal (Justice Africa and Harvard University) and Ann Swidler (University of California, Berkeley) addressed the potential impact on state capacity and governance. Allan Rosenfield, director of Columbia University's MTCT+ initiative, and Carla Obermeyer of the World Health Organization each gave their perspective on the need for social science research to be connected with HIV/AIDS interventions as they are being designed and implemented. Additional sessions explored the connections between research and practice; gender and intergenerational relations; and global governance of the pandemic.

Arts Program

The Arts Program held the second of its three conferences for the year on the topic of "The Impact of Art on People's Lives," October 31-November 1 at Claremont University, CA. Psychologist and Arts committee member Mihaly Csiksentmihalyi organized and led the conference, which brought together other Arts committee members with researchers and practitioners invested in measuring the value of the arts to personal experience. The meeting explored a range of methods, institutional contexts, and challenges associated with measurement efforts.

Children and Armed Conflict Program

The Children and Armed Conflict Program (CAC) hosted a planning meeting of its research network on May 15-16, 2003. Participants came from Colombia, the Philippines, Belgium, Norway and the US, and were drawn from a range of academic institutions, non-governmental organizations and policymaking bodies such as UNICEF. The meeting helped the program plan its research agenda for the next couple of years; made recommendations with regard to the *modus operandi* of the research network and its governance structure; and helped set the ground for the implementation of two initiatives.

The first project is an effort to strengthen research capacity on CAC in the Great Lakes region. This involves a regional workshop, a three-week training institute and modest stipend support for a fellowship program for local researchers. The second project will focus on four countries—Angola, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka—and involves both the collection of new disaggregated data on the impact of armed conflict on children and the training of local researchers to undertake data gathering. This will be preceded by an international, multidisciplinary gathering to reflect on definitions, terminologies and indicators specific to data gathering on children and armed conflict.

Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum

Central Asia
On October 17-18 the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF), in cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), organized a meeting entitled "Borders, Transit, and Trade: Issues and Opportunities for Central Asia," in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. The meeting addressed issues related to the strengthening of effective border control, regulation of transit and promotion of mutually beneficial trade, and brought together approximately forty participants, including: Ministerial representation from the countries concerned, experts from the UN system, the OSCE, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission and the World Trade Organisation, as well as a select group of independent scholars and experts.

Strengthening Analytical Capacity at the United Nations
On September 18-19, CPPF and the United Nations Department for Political Affairs organized a workshop on Strengthening Analytical Capacity at the United Nations. It was the first of an intended series of workshops and is part of a larger project on knowledge management within the UN Secretariat. The meeting brought together representatives of different departments within the UN Secretariat, international experts and representatives of research institutions.

DRC and Great Lakes
On April 28, CPPF held a consultation on short and medium-term trends and present challenges to the peace process in the DRC. The meeting brought together leading experts on the DRC and the Great Lakes region from Africa, Europe and North America with UN headquarters' staff.

Andes
On May 29-30, CPPF, along with the Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales and the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar of Ecuador, held the final meeting of the project "Security and Democracy in the Andes: Towards a Regional Agenda." Five consultancy teams and the members of the co-secretariat developed the project, which was funded by the United Nations Development Programme and the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations. At the meeting in La Paz, key UN officers from Bolivia, the region and Headquarters debated the five national papers that analyze the threats to democratic security in each of the Andean nations. Also discussed was a working document urging that these problems be understood in a regional context.

Bolivia
In May, CPPF co-sponsored with the United Nations Development Programme a consultation on the current political situation in Bolivia. The meeting brought together members of Bolivian civil society, academics and politicians with senior UN staff from Bolivia and the region in order to gain a deeper understanding of the potential triggers of conflict such as coca/cocaine, water, gas and territory.

Culture, Creativity and Information Technology

Intellectual Property, Markets, and Cultural Flows Project
The Intellectual Property, Markets, and Cultural Flows Project held its launch conference on October 24-25 in New York City, bringing together thirty researchers, legal scholars and advocates from around the world. The program is intended to mobilize research on the role of intellectual property in the emerging global information society, focusing on the cultural flows between developed and developing countries and on the convergence of culture, trade, technology, and information policy. Conference panels focused on three "problem topics" for intellectual property regimes related to cultural production: piracy and informal networks of exchange; open source, open access and the role of the commons; and traditional knowledge; as well as how these issues relate to institutions, processes, and participation in the governance of intellectual property. James Leach (Cambridge, UK), Ravi Sundaram (Sarai-New Delhi), Siva Vaidhyanathan (NYU), and Stefaan Verhulst (Markle Foundation) acted as moderators and rapporteurs.

Media and Democracy
The SSRC and the Media, Arts, and Culture division of the Ford Foundation held a research planning meeting on media and democracy at the SSRC Washington, DC office on October 23. Craig Calhoun and Becky Lentz (Ford Foundation) led a day of exchanges between activists, advocates and researchers on media issues, including media concentration, spectrum allocation, access issues, and the technological infrastructures that support normative demands on the media. The meeting is the first step in planning a larger Media and Democracy program, in collaboration with the Ford Foundation.

Economy and Society

Summer Field Research Grants
The Program in Applied Economics is pleased to announce the first Summer Field Research Grants awarded under its new focus on economic risk and uncertainty. The seventeen grants awarded in the inaugural competition will support a wide range of student research projects addressing the theme of Risk and Development. The Summer Grant program has replaced the Fellowship in Applied Economics, with the intention of providing direct support of innovative economic research that addresses crucial real-world issues. To this end, this year's Summer Grant recipients are more interdisciplinary than previous PAE award cohorts, representing geography, sociology and urban studies departments, in addition to top-tier economics and agricultural economics programs. A full list of the 2003 Summer Grant recipients and their

projects can be found on the program's web page: www.ssrc.org/programs/app_econ/grant_awardees.page

Emerging Pathways to Innovation in Asia
On September 12-13, the Applied Economics Program and the Economy and Society Program Area sponsored an interdisciplinary planning meeting to consider how research on the nature and implications of recent patterns of innovation in Asia might inform a better understanding of development prospects in the region and globally. Convened at the SSRC's offices in New York City, the meeting, entitled "Emerging Pathways to Innovation in Asia: Firm Strategies, Business Institutions, and Governance," brought together a multinational group of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and representatives from development bodies to assess how firm strategies, businesses as social institutions, and governance regimes have both responded to and shaped the outcomes of new innovation efforts in knowledge-driven international production networks. The event was co-organized by Eric Hershberg of SSRC and Dieter Ernst of the East-West Center. Council President Craig Calhoun and staff members Ashley Timmer, Doug Guthrie, and Jason McNichol also participated in the discussions. Several new collaborative research possibilities, focusing on issues ranging from the migration of high-skilled workers to the regulation of intellectual property rights, were considered at the meeting. Since the event, Council staff have continued to explore promising opportunities with colleagues in Europe, North America, and Asia.

Annual Fellows Conference
In mid-May the Program in Applied Economics (PAE) held its annual fellows conference for the 2002-2003 cohort of awardees. The meeting, held at a conference center outside idyllic Santa Cruz, CA, brought the diverse group of fellows together for an intensive three-day exchange of research ideas and experiences, with presentation topics ranging from trends in news consumption to community cooperation and deforestation in Mexico. As many fellows hailed from different universities, the meeting also afforded the students a chance to meet and network with other young economists at similar career stages. The group also received valuable professional advice from the economics faculty in attendance: David McKenzie of Stanford University, Gregory Besharov of Duke University, and Dean Karlan of Princeton University, who is a PAE summer workshop alumnus. A full list of the 2002-2003 cohort of PAE fellows and their projects is available on the program's web site: www.ssrc.org/pae .

Eurasia Program

Remembering Communism
On September 22-23, the Eurasia Program's Remembering Communism project co-organized a workshop with the Georg-Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany. The workshop, entitled "Remembering Communism: Genres of

Representation," included 17 participants who explored through their papers the different ways that life under communism is represented in film, textbooks, scholarly discourses and propaganda. The presentations highlighted the variety of meanings encompassed by the word "communism" and the way these meanings change depending upon country, generation, scholarly discipline and political environment. Scholars from a number of countries, including Bulgaria, Germany, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and the United States participated in the meeting. SSRC staff included Seteney Shami and Elissa Klein.

Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan
The Eurasia Program met with Muratali adjy Djumanov in the SSRC New York office on June 19, 2003. Mr. Djumanov, the Mufti of Kyrgyzstan, was accompanied by his deputy, Mr. Marazykov. As the Mufti, Mr. Djumanov heads the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, under which most mosques in Kyrgyzstan are united. The meeting was part of a new State Department grant awarded to the Eurasia Program in early June 2003. Under the new grant, the Eurasia Program will undertake curriculum reform projects with the Bishkek Islamic Institute in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The new project will entail both exchange components and training components as well as a number of workshops, conferences, and publications.

In August, a representative from the Eurasia Program visited Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to observe the new curriculum development project. Educational reform in Kyrgyzstan has been very extensive over the last few years, as the Ministry of Education has pushed forward a number of important reforms, including a system of standardized testing. Religious education, due to strict separation of church and state in Kyrgyzstan, has not been affected by the recent educational reforms. The current Educational Partnership Program, being undertaken by the Eurasia Program, aims to add a secular component to the strictly Islamic training at the Kyrgyz Islamic Institute. This initiative is part of the institute's attempts to provide greater breadth of instruction to its students and eventually provide its graduates with accredited degrees. While in Bishkek, the Eurasia Program representative met with members of the Public Affairs

department of the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, the rector and vice rector of the Kyrgyz Islamic University, relevant Kyrgyz government officials, the Kyrgyz Mufti, and other interested parties.

Selection Committee Meeting

On April 25-26, the Eurasia Program held its annual Title VIII Oversight and Selection Committee meeting at the SSRC office in New York. The Title VIII Selection Committee is composed of 11 members, 7 of whom work on the sub-committee for fellowships. The fellowship sub-committee recommended individual awards for graduate training, dissertation write-ups, and post-doctoral research and faculty curriculum development projects. The language sub-committee, composed of the remaining 4 members of the selection committee, awarded over $300,000 in grants to US university programs for summer instruction in the languages of Eurasia.

The selection committee not only awarded Title VIII grants, funded by the US State Department, but committee members also evaluated the past successes of the Title VIII fellowship programs at SSRC and discussed plans for the program's future. Additionally, plans were discussed for expanding activities such as the dissertation workshops and for improving upcoming fellowship applications and advertising.

Dissertation Development Workshop

On April 6-7, the Eurasia Program held its final dissertation development workshop in a series of three focusing on Central Asia and the Caucasus. This year's workshop was held at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. It was composed of ten graduate students, chosen on a nationally competitive basis, and four faculty members representing different social science disciplines. The students, working on dissertations ranging from tuberculosis and health care issues in the country of Georgia to legal and economic factors associated with agricultural production in Central Asia, received comments and suggestions from their peers and the faculty members. The faculty and student participants were a truly interdisciplinary group of excellent scholars, undertaking important new work in the Central Asian and Caucasian region.

In addition to the two-day workshop, the Eurasia Program organized two events in which workshop participants interacted with relevant graduate students, faculty, and administrators from the University of Michigan and the university's International Institute. A forum for workshop faculty and University of Michigan faculty allowed for all present to discuss the state of Eurasian, Middle Eastern, Central Asian and Caucasian studies in an interdisciplinary and cross-regional setting, and a reception allowed for a larger group of workshop participants and interested individuals from the university to discuss their research and study programs in an informal setting at the International Institute Gallery. The Eurasia Program is currently planning next year's workshop, which will most likely revolve around issues of governance in Eurasia. This year's and past workshops have been supported by the US Department of State through the Title VIII program.

Global Security and Cooperation Program

International Law and International Relations

On November 6, the Global Security and Cooperation Program (GSC) held the final workshop in its series on International Law and International Relations. Intended to explore possibilities for collaboration between the fields of international law and international relations, both in theory and practice, the series has considered how social science research can be mobilized effectively to enhance the utility of international norms through law. This workshop concentrated on issues pertaining to International Criminal Accountability, while previous workshops examined the topics of Small Arms, Terrorism, and Internally Displaced Persons.

Workshop participants discussed how prosecutions of international crimes highlight tensions between international politics on the one hand, and the enforcement of international law on the other, and how the mere existence of these international institutions and legal proceedings before domestic courts might increase the prominence, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international criminal law. Insights from international relations theory were combined with those from international legal scholarship regarding the development of "hard" and "soft" law and institutional design to more fully explain, assess, and even speculate about the future of international criminal accountability. The workshop also examined the historical and political contexts that at times prevented and at other times facilitated the development of international criminal accountability norms. A case-study panel used the context of the current situation in Iraq with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein's regime to address how societies in transition deal with the notion of international criminal accountability.

A diverse group of academics and international law practitioners were on hand to delve into the topic and analyze the various aspects of this developing field. Among them were Judge Richard May, president of the Trial Chamber III at the ICTY, and presiding judge at the trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic; Michael Johnson, chief of prosecutions ICTY, former deputy chief prosecutor ICTR; Amb. Pierre Prosper, ambassador at large for war crimes, US State Department; Amb. David Scheffer, former US ambassador at large for war crimes and head of the US delegation to the ICC talks; Dr. Tariq Ali Al-Saleh, chair of the Iraqi Jurists' Association; Kathryn Sikkink, University of Minnesota; and Thomas Biersteker, Watson Institute, Brown University.

The third installment of the series, held on on June 13, dealt with the issue of Internally Displaced Persons. This workshop featured an exceptional opportunity to learn from

and challenge Francis Deng, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on IDPs. Having held this position since 1992, Dr. Deng welcomed the opportunity to discuss what has been achieved so far, and to examine issues such as how global norms are created; the relationship between norms and law; sovereignty and global norms; and the viability of international organizations as purveyors of norms and law. For more information about the International Law and International Relations series, please contact program staff or visit the website: www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/ .

Roundtable Series on War and Terrorism

On July 9, 2003, the SSRC's Washington office held another of its roundtable series on War and Terrorism with Dr. Joost Hilterman. Dr. Hilterman is the Middle East Project Director for the International Crisis Group. He is currently writing a book on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, supported by grants from the Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation. The talk revolved around his recent field visit to Baghdad and northern Iraq. He addressed the de-Arabization of northern Iraq, the status of the Kurdish population in Iraq after the war, political transition in Iraq and the current security crisis and how it can be averted to establish a more stable environment. Additionally, he provided a general overview of the successes and failures of the reconstruction phase of American and British involvement in Iraq.

Future of Multilateral Arms

On June 26-28, the Program on Global Security and Cooperation (GSC) convened a workshop on "The Future of Multilateral Arms Control" in Paris, France. The event was co-sponsored by the Fond d'analyse des societes politiques (FASOPO), a new transnational research group. This GSC initiative responds swiftly to very recent international developments. The war in Iraq, the diplomatic wrangling before the war and the continued discord in its aftermath all suggest that multilateral arms control faces a crisis of legitimacy and viability. The brainstorming session sought to sort out the implications of the last several months for these accords and institutions. The diverse group of international scholars and practitioners addressed such questions as the fate of multilateralism, the decline of NATO, the culture of American hegemony, and the regional challenges of Iran, China and North Korea, all in the context of the post-Iraq situation. The workshop both helped frame the topics at stake and identify new areas of needed research on multilateral arms control and international security in general. Follow-up activities are currently being developed under Program Director John Tirman's leadership. The GSC Program is also pursuing two other related lines of inquiry: the South Asian Nuclear Project (headed by Itty Abraham) and another project on the Korean Peninsula (headed by Leon Sigal) that will explore some of these same topical issues.

Photo by workshop participant Chung-in Moon, Yonsei University, Korea

South Asian Nuclear Project

On May 30-31, the Global Security and Cooperation Program held the inaugural meeting for the South Asian Nuclear Project at the SSRC's Washington Office. The conference brought together 24 of North America's leading scholars on issues of South Asian nuclearization in order to discuss the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan and how the legacy of the Cold War has affected understanding of the dynamics of nuclearization in this region. This was the first of four proposed meetings of the South Asian Nuclear Project, a new GSC endeavor aimed at forming a network which provides a forum to discuss competing theories and perspectives on the nature of the South Asian nuclear system, with the ultimate objective of crafting new approaches and policies promoting durable nuclear restraint in the region. For further information, please contact either Petra Ticha or Maggie Schuppert in the GSC Program.

Information Technology and International Cooperation Program

On July 9-11, the Information Technology and International Cooperation Program (ITIC) held its second meeting with five Information Technology and Social Transformation (ITST) scholars in Ottawa, Canada, at the IDRC (International Development Research Center). Each of the ITST scholars gave presentations at the meeting detailing their current research. The meeting was held in tandem with the UNDP's Development Practice Meeting entitled: "Towards an Open Information Society." The purpose of the UNDP's meeting was to refine its strategy in relation to ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) for Development. Discussion touched on methodologies, partnerships, and resource mobilization in an effort to aid countries in achieving their Millennium Development Goals as outlined by the UN. This meeting marked the inception of a partnership between the UNDP and the SSRC (which will serve as a convener of scholars and a purveyor of contextual research and analysis to inform policy).

International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship

The International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship Program (IDRF) hosted its eleventh fellows' workshop in Vancouver, British Columbia from October 16-21. The workshop is a requirement of the IDRF fellowship and aims to create a cohort of fellows that is both cross-disciplinary and cross-regional. Along with providing a forum for fellows to discuss their dissertation research in its varying stages, the workshop also affords them an opportunity to exchange ideas with facilitators and peers regarding the more general aspects of theory, research methodology, write-up and field-work experience.

The 19 participating fellows were grant recipients from the 2002 cohort who have recently returned from their field research and are at the beginning stages of dissertation writing. They presented their work on panels, which were grouped around common themes across disciplines and regions. The program invited Brent Edwards (Department of English, Rutgers University) and Gay Seidman (Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison) to serve as workshop facilitators, while SSRC staff included Nicole Stahlmann, Kevin Moore and Laura Hilburn.

International Migration Program

Forced Migration and Human Rights

The final meeting of the Forced Migration and Human Rights Project of the International Migration Program was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone on November 4-7. The three-year project fostered collaboration between social scientists and practitioners who work for international human rights and humanitarian organizations. Focusing on issues of definition, causes, protection and solutions to forced migration, five teams researched the situation of Sierra Leoneans who, in the context of a civil war, were forced to flee their homes to other parts of their country or other nations in West Africa. In addition to evaluating the research, the conference participants—including local and international researchers from academic, humanitarian, and human rights organizations—considered how a similar project might be developed to focus on East Africa. The research papers will be edited for publication.

Immigrants and Faith

As part of the Council's efforts to bridge the gap between academic scholarship and the media, the International Migration Program sponsored a panel entitled "Immigrants and Faith" at this year's Religion Newswriters Association (RNA) conference in Seattle, September 5-7. Each year the RNA hosts a number of expert panels to inform religion reporters in the secular media, and the conference provides an excellent forum for introducing journalists to relevant social science research. The panel, which was chaired by former *New York Times* religion writer, Gustav Niebuhr, sought to alert journalists to several ways in which migration is changing the religious landscape in the United States, including immigrant conversion (and non-conversion) to and impact on "American" religions, the introduction and development of new religious practices, and the significance of immigrants' transnational religious activities in linking religious institutions and practices in the United States and their home countries. Three scholars connected with the International Migration Program's working group on Religion, Immigration, and Civic Life presented their research on Christianity and Buddhism among Korean immigrants (Sharon Suh, University of Seattle); and on Protestantism and Catholicism among Mexicans (respectively by Patricia Fortuny Foret de Mola, Center of Research and Advanced Studies in Social Anthropology in Merida, and Roberto Lint-Sagarena, University of Southern California). Next year, Richard Alba and Albert Raboteau, the co-chairs of the working group on Religion, Migration, and Civic Life and editors of a forthcoming volume on the same topic, will take part in a RNA panel that will examine, from an historical comparative perspective, the ways in which the beliefs and practices of migrants are contributing to religious diversity in the United States.

Program on Latin America and the Caribbean

Scholarly Collaboration Cuba/North America

The American Council of Learned Societies/Social Science Research Council Working Group on Cuba announces its seventh program of grants to promote academic collaboration between scholars in Cuba and North America.

In cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of Cuba, the Group has initiated and organized activities with scholarly institutions in Cuba and North America and will provide a number of small grants for the following kinds of activities:

1) Supporting environmental initiatives that bring together Cuban and North American institutions in collaborative efforts to a) understand and disseminate information on the state of the environment, as well as the various forces affecting the biodiversity of the region; b)

promote and provide training and education on environment conservation and sustainable development in Cuba and; c) support the exchange of expertise, research techniques and information sharing initiatives among Cuban and North American ecologists, curators, biologists, economists and other environmental specialists.

2) Increasing the flow of researchers between Cuba and North America by providing funds for: a) Cuban scholars to participate in international conferences and educational seminars outside of Cuba; and b) North American researchers invited by Cuban institutions to present lectures or participate in workshops in Cuba.
3) Other initiatives to support academic exchange and increase communication between researchers in Cuba and North America on issues related to the environment and sustainable development in the region.

For information on eligibility and application requirements, please visit the SSRC Cuba Program web page at: www.ssrc.org/fellowships/cuba/

Inequality in Latin America

On Nov. 8, Latin America Program staff took part in a joint Princeton-Oxford seminar focusing on Persistent Inequalities in Latin America. Held at Princeton University, with input from a network of researchers based at Stony Brook University as well as from researchers at Oxford and the SSRC, the seminar analyzed the nature and scope of inequality in the region in historical, economic, political and anthropological contexts. The discussion was enriched by presentations on several ongoing research agendas, encompassing such issues as trends in Latin American fiscal policy and the complexities of race and ethnicity as they intersect with patterns of inequality in Latin America. In attendance were Jeremy Adelman, Joao Biehl, Albert Hirschman, Paul Sigmund, Michael Stone and Roberto Laserna of Princeton; Jeanine Anderson, Paul Gootenberg and Luis Reygadas of Stony Brook; Rodrigo Cubero, Paulo Drinot de Echave, Valpy Fitzgerald, Alan Knight, Line Schjolden and Rosemary Thorp of Oxford; and Eric Hershberg, Marcial Godoy and Kate Levitt, of the Council.

On July 9, the Latin America Program convened a small group of scholars at the SSRC offices to discuss questions of inequality in Latin America and possible programmatic activities designed to encourage innovative and relevant work in the area. Conversation focused on the major themes illuminating inequality in the region and the complex processes that shape patterns of persistence and reproduction. In addition to SSRC staff, participants included Jeremy Adelman (Princeton University), Miguel Centeno (Princeton University), Paul Gootenberg (SUNY Stony Brook) and Charles Tilly (Columbia University).

Initiative on Cuban Libraries and Archives

During October and early November, the Initiative on Cuban Libraries and Archives made substantial progress with various training workshops at several Cuban institutions. Walter Newman, of NEDCC, taught a course to 32 students on Preventive Conservation of Archive Documents in the province of Sancti Spiritus. The class was sponsored by the Dirección General de Archivos, as well as the Institute of History and the University of Sancti Spiritus. The Dirección General de Archivos also sponsored a workshop on document assessment, which was given by Spanish archivist Lluís Cermeno Martorell. Finally, Gary Albright, of the State University College at Buffalo, gave a very productive and informative course on the conservation of photographs to employees of the Institute of History.

Several consultants of the ACLS/SSRC Working Group on Cuba visited the country to assess and scan the Hemingway collection for the Hemingway Preservation Project. Amy Wood, of the Center for Research Libraries, and John Grimshaw, of Electronic Imaging Services, spent five days conducting a training course on scanning for Cuban archivists at the Patrimonio de Cultura de Cuba, which will allow those involved in the project to effectively preserve and create electronic images of Hemingway's valuable letters, documents and photographs. Following the scanning workshop, Deb Wender, Book Conservator of Northeast Document Conservation Center, traveled to the Hemingway House in Cuba to survey the preservation needs of books and train staff in making protective enclosures.

Racial Formations in the Americas

On October 16-17, the Program on Latin America convened a planning meeting on Racial Formations in the Americas. The two-day discussion addressed the central themes concerning race and ethnicity in the hemisphere, examining emerging and innovative currents of research, the diverse disciplinary and institutional contexts within which race and ethnicity are studied, and the challenges posed to researchers by recent global transformations. Special attention was paid to the points of contact and divergence between scholars in different fields, disciplines and geographic locations, as participants worked to establish a framework around which to develop an initiative that would foster greater communication and collaboration among students, scholars and researchers throughout the Americas. The objective of such a Council-sponsored effort would be to act a catalyst for innovative and new approaches to the study of race and ethnicity in the region. Attending the planning meeting were Marisol de la Cadena (UC Davis), David Goldberg (UCHRI), Michael Hanchard (Northwestern), Jean Rahier (FIU), Ana Yolanda Ramos (Rutgers), Livio Sansone (U Bahia) and Howard Winant (UCSB), as well as SSRC Staff.

Social Citizenship and Democratic Incorporation

On August 4, Latin America Program staff held a planning meeting at the offices of FLACSO-Costa Rica for its initiative on "Social Citizenship and Democratic Incorporation: Toward an Agenda for Development in Central Americ a."

Leading Central America social scientists, members of the Ebert Foundation and SSRC staff discussed the state of social science research and training in development-related fields in the region as well as the thematic and analytical foci of a potential program of research and training in these fields. In attendence were Eduardo Baumeister (Independent Researcher, Managua), Marcial Godoy-Anativia (SSRC), Eric Hershberg (SSRC), Berthold Leimbach (Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, San Jose), Juan Pablo Perez Sainz (FLACSO-CR), Alexander Segovia (Independent Researcher, San Salvador/Guatemala), Carlos Sojo (FLACSO-CR), Anja Stuckert (Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, Guatemala), Edelberto Torres-Rivas (PNUD Guatemala).

Regional Advisory Panel Meeting
Members of the Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) for the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean met in San Jose, Costa Rica on August 1-2 at the offices of FLACSO-Costa Rica to discuss ongoing projects in the program, recent Council-wide developments as well as potential new initiatives. Members of the RAP discussed current publication activities related to the Program on Memories of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru, assessed the progress of the Translocal Flows in the Americas Project, discussed further development of the program on Central American development and the social sciences, and provided input and suggestions with respect to the initial steps of an initiative on Racial Formations in the Americas. Of particular interest were the discussions of the Committee on the subject of inequality as a focus of future Latin America program initiatives. In attendance were, Elizabeth Jelin (IDES-Argentina), Jeremey Adelman (Princeton and Chair), Paul Drake (UCSD), Rossana Reguillo (ITESO-Mexico), Juan Pablo Perez Sainz (FLACSO-Costa Rica), Eric Hershberg (SSRC) and Marcial Godoy-Anativia(SSRC).

Translocal Flows
As part of its ongoing project on Translocal Flows in the Americas, the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean held a conference on the themes of "Migrations, Borders and Diasporas in the Americas" on June 26-28 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The conference was organized in conjunction with FLACSO-Dominican Republic and attended by the 17 participants who were selected from an open call for papers held earlier in the year (abstracts can be found at translocal-flows.ssrc.org). The conference included scholars from a number of disciplines and fields, including sociologists, historians, anthropologists, literary critics and geographers. Over a period of three days, participants and a number of invited local scholars and collaborators discussed previously distributed papers as well as an ongoing research project at FLACSO-DR on the Haiti-Dominican border. Plenary discussions dealt with issues of sociocultural remittances, diverse migrant and diasporic identities, the role of state institutions in migratory processes, and the racialization of migrants in the context of both regional migrations within Latin America and the Caribbean as well as those from Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States.

Mellon Mays Fellowship Program

From June 10-15, the Social Science Research Council hosted the Twelfth Annual SSRC-Mellon Mays Summer Conference at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.

Photo by Sandra Cartwright

More than 200 Fellows, 46 of them recent PhDs, joined SSRC and Mellon Foundation staff, University of Pennsylvania and other invited faculty, as well as editors from the university presses at Temple and U PENN. Activities included workshops, panels, and fellows' presentations around the theme, "Academic Selves: Under Construction." Next year's conference will take place June 8-13, 2004, at the University of Washington in St. Louis.

Program on the Middle East & North Africa

Surveying Middle East Studies and International Collaboration
Several activities were organized by the Program on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the annual Middle East Studies Association (MESA) conference, held this year in Anchorage, Alaska between November 6-9. The MENA program organized a special session entitled Surveying Middle East Studies: Towards a Global Perspective, as well as a thematic conversation entitled International Collaboration at a Time of Crisis. Both sessions were chaired by MENA Program Director Seteney Shami.

The session Surveying Middle East Studies: Towards a Global Perspective presented the results of a two-year SSRC initiative aimed at surveying the state of training and research in Middle Eastern studies in select countries. Survey results addressed various shifts in the infrastructure of scholarship taking place, such as: course numbers and content, degree programs, enrollment numbers, language training, employment opportunities, faculty composition, and research and publishing trends. The North America case study was presented by Anne Betteridge (University of Arizona) and Juan Cole (University of Michigan), while Svetlana Kirillina (Moscow State University), Randi Deguilhem (AFEMAM

and Aix en Provence), and Toru Miura (JAMES and Ochanomizu University), presented the Russian, French and Japanese initiatives respectively. The session was particularly timely in light of recent controversies over Middle East studies in the US, accompanied, paradoxically, by the reorganization of universities and disciplines in different countries around the world along American models.

The thematic conversation on International Collaboration emerged from the SSRC International Collaborative Research Grants Competition (ICRG)—a program based on a vision that collaboration in research can be and should be rewarded, and that excellence through collaboration reaps benefits that can be far more transformative than individual efforts and achievements. This unique competition supports collaborative research teams that include but are not limited to researchers in the MENA region, working together with international scholars. The topics explored in this first conversation included: concepts and processes of collaboration; inter-disciplinarity in collaboration; capacity building for collaborative research at the pre & post PhD levels; institutional collaboration and the role of information technology in collaborative research. The conversation included four speakers, all current ICRG awardees, living in different countries and thus bringing in perspectives that include the difficulties and potentialities of collaboration from both within and from outside the region: Ray Jureidini (American University in Beirut), Mike Robinson (Sheffield Hallam University), Martina Reiker (American University in Cairo), and Modjtaba Sadria (Chuo University).

Development of Middle East Studies in the US Academy

On October 17-18, the Program on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) organized a brainstorming meeting, convening specialists in Middle East studies together with specialists in American studies, intellectual history and US higher education. The purpose was to launch a research program into the history and development of Middle East studies in the US academy, from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Key topics included: (1) existing assessments of Middle East studies in the US, (2) writing an institutional history of an inter-discipline, (3) methodological issues, (4) overseas crises and the US academy. Lisa Anderson, Thomas Bender, Michael Hudson, Peter Novick, Seteney Shami and Steven Wheatley served as session chairs. Based on discussions resulting from this and previous planning meetings, SSRC staff members in collaboration with several scholars (Lisa Anderson, Thomas Bender, John Eilts, Nancy Gallagher, Thomas Haskell, Ussama Makdesi, Amy Newhall, Roger Owen and Robert Vitalis) have developed a research proposal that is currently being presented to several donors. The proposed project will not only help chart the history of the field of Middle East studies but will also contribute methodologically to investigating the construction of inter-disciplines and will serve as a model for conducting similar research in other countries. The MENA program is also providing seed funding for initiating a similar project in Russia.

International Collaborative Research Grants

The Program on the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) recently completed the final selection process for the second International Collaborative Research Grants (ICRG) competition. These grants are intended to support collaborative research on the MENA region, particularly encouraging the development of intra-regional and international linkages among scholars. Having solicited proposals that bring together researchers in different locations to address issues related to the theme of "Reconceptualizing Public Spheres," the program received a total of 23 collaborative applications involving 82 scholars. The two-phase selection process involved a preliminary selection of ten semifinalist teams followed by a proposal development workshop and concluded with the final selection committee meeting, which took place in Paris on June 6 at the Institut d'Études de l'Islam et des Sociétés du Monde Musulman (IISMM) of the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. The committee had the difficult task of choosing awardees from among a group of highly competitive proposals and ultimately decided to grant awards to the six outstanding projects. For a list of awardees please visit www.ssrc.org/programs/mena/ .

Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector

On October 20, the Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector held a planning meeting for the capstone event of its fellowship program, to be held in January 2005. The meeting will explore two crucial parallel themes regarding the role of philanthropic organizations in society today, each of which will result in a volume. The first theme will focus on the impact of the philanthropic sector overseas: The Impact of Philanthropic Sector Across Borders: Sending Institutional Logics Abroad. The second theme will focus on domestic issues: Philanthropy and the Receding Welfare State. The planning meeting was attended by Philanthropy committee members Paul DiMaggio, Elizabeth Clemens, and David Hammack, as well as SSRC staff Craig Calhoun, Doug Guthrie and Amy Withers.

Sexuality Research Fellowship Program

8th Annual Fellows Conference

On October 23-25, the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program held its 8th annual fellows conference in New York City, co-hosted by the Center for Gender, Sexuality, and Health of the Sociomedical Sciences Department at Columbia University, the HIV Center for Clinical and Behavioral Studies at Columbia University, and the Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality at New York University. In attendance were 20 postdoctorate and dissertation fellows, a number of former fellows from 1996-2002, research associates/advisers, invited guest participants and staff mem-

bers Diane di Mauro and Lissa Gundlach.

The conference began with activities and a reception at New York University. Marvin Taylor, director of Special Collections at the Fales Library, acquainted the group with materials specific to sexuality, and Carolyn Dinshaw, director of the Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality, hosted a panel presentation entitled "Sexuality, the View from NYU." A reception for the fellows group and NYU faculty followed in the Center for Gender and Sexuality Studies.

Mary Gray, 2003 Dissertation Fellow, and Susan Dreisbach, second year 2002 Postdoctoral Fellow.

On Friday, October 25, the conference attendees were treated to two panel presentations provided by Columbia University's HIV Center for Clinical and Behavioral Studies and the Center for Gender, Sexuality and Health. Entitled "Doing Sexuality Research with Diverse Populations," the morning panel included ongoing research initiatives of researchers working in the sexuality field, and focused specifically on studying issues inherent in research designs involving women, adolescents, and gay and lesbian subjects.

In the afternoon, the Center for Gender, Sexuality, and Health of the Sociomedical Sciences Program presented a panel discussion, led by Center director and department chair Richard Parker. The presentations, featuring current research by faculty, focused on sexual rights and sexual health, dealing in particular with urban youth, community partnerships, and sex work. The panels concluded with a reception at Milstein Hospital. On Saturday, the conference concluded at the SSRC with a day of one-on-one, small group and large group conversations, as well as presentations by SRFP guests and former fellows.

Saturday evening, conference participants enjoyed a formal dinner hosted by the SSRC-SRFP at the garden room of Julian's restaurant in midtown. The 2003 SRFP Fellows Conference provided a wonderfully diverse forum for continuing scholarship in this area, and an important opportunity for networking, exchanging research ideas and interests, and professional linking across a wide range of disciplines in the field.

International Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy

On October 17-18, the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program hosted the quarterly meeting of the International Working Group on Sexuality and Social Policy (IWGSSP)—a new Ford Foundation initiative based at Columbia University. The mandate of the IWGSSP is to contribute to global policy debates relating to sexuality through strategic, policy-oriented research and analysis and to promote more effective linkages between initiatives in local, regional and global arenas. As a global forum, it is composed of researchers and activists from all of the major geographical regions of the world. The meeting participants included Richard Parker, chair of the SMS Dept. of Columbia University; David Satcher, the former US Surgeon General and director of the National Advisory Council based at Morehouse College; Gilbert Herdt, director of the National Sexuality Resource Center at SFSU and SRFP selection committee member; Rosalind Petchesky, former SRFP research associate and professor of political science and women's studies at Hunter College, CUNY and Ignacio Saiz, Deputy Director of Regional Programs for Amnesty International in the UK, as well as representatives from the Ford Foundation and researchers and activists from Brazil, India, and Nigeria. Discussion focused on the ongoing initiatives and future directions of the IWGSSP, namely, the compiling of a global bibliography on sexual rights drawing on both local-level and global sources, the monitoring of global and country-specific policies that impact sexual health/rights, and the mapping of regional discussions and debates on sexual rights, sexual health and sexuality education. SSRC program staff in attendance were Diane di Mauro and Lissa Gundlach.

South Asia Program

Fellows Announced

Fourteen awards were announced for the second year of the South Asia Regional Fellowship Program (2003-4) on the theme of "migration." The selection committee convened in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 28-29, to discuss and review 74 proposals received from the region. In choosing this year's awardees, priority was given to proposals for writing up completed research. Fellowships were awarded to eight applicants from India, three from Pakistan, two from Sri Lanka and one from Bangladesh. Eleven fellowships were awarded to junior scholars and three to senior scholars.

The new cohort of fellows, which represents several non-urban universities, will be writing on migration from a range of disciplines including history, urban studies, gender studies, and economics. Fellowships were awarded to several projects studying the impact and experience of migration on marginalized communities in South Asia during the 1947 and 1971 partitions. One study, for instance, will look at women's experiences of migration in Pakistan during the 1947 Partition, while another seeks to address the stigmatized identity of the Sindhi community who migrated to Gujarat during

the 1947 Partition. Investigations on internal displacement and migration include a study on Nepalis and Muslim peasants residing in northeast India, while another examines the plight of migrants working in the informal sector of Calcutta. New areas of study touch upon the role of sexuality amongst migrant female garment workers in Sri Lanka and the depiction of migration in short stories.

The South Asia Program is now looking forward to the upcoming fellow's workshop where fellows will discuss their research projects with each other and with members of the committee. The workshop will be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, December 17-19.

South Asia Regional Advisory Panel

On August 26, the South Asia Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) convened in Colombo, Sri Lanka, to discuss and plan a new initiative on organizing a regional social science conference in South Asia. The conference will be the first such regional gathering and will occur biannually, focusing on interdisciplinary themes of regional significance. The first conference, which is planned for August 2005, will include 150 participants from the region. It is expected that this initiative, which is an extension of the South Asia Regional Fellowship Program, will serve as a forum for transnational community building and scholarly exchange across national and disciplinary boundaries. Joining SSRC in this initiative will be its existing partner organizations in the region, including the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; Social Scientists' Association, Colombo; Centre for Alternatives, Dhaka; Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad; and Social Science Baha, Kathmandu. An advisory board comprised of existing RAP members and several smaller committees will oversee and direct the initiative. The Ford Foundation, Delhi, has expressed interest in funding the initiative.

Borders and Regional Markets, Economies, Cultures

The South Asia and Southeast Asia Programs with support from the Open Society Institute's Burma Project held a workshop on "Borders and Regional Markets, Economies, Cultures" July 4-6. The workshop, co-organized by Professor Sanjib Baruah of Bard College and Professor Willem van Schendel of Amsterdam University, was held at the International Center at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. This is the first phase of an initiative that seeks to understand the complexities of transnational linkages in this region and aims to conceptualize the borderlands in their own terms beyond the constraints of the burden of modern nation-state centric cartography. Although the field of "Borderland Studies" is growing and expanding in scholarship, sufficient attention is not being given to the borders and the borderland communities lying between southwest China, northern Burma and Thailand and northeast India and Bangladesh. Borders between these countries are permeable and fluid, and for centuries there has been movement across them. The communities residing in this region are now divided among many states, but the cultures, economies and scale of population movement that exist here all suggest that this region should be approached in a distinct manner. Participants from India, Burma, Thailand and China were invited to write original papers about the impact borders have had on the interaction between the peoples in these regions. Borders were discussed in relation to identity, nation building, memory and trade. The workshop agenda included an overnight field trip to the Thailand-Burma border where participants experienced for themselves the market culture and lifestyle of the borderland. The workshop created considerable enthusiasm among the participants and has given rise to the Asian Borderland Studies Group. Over the next few months, the organizers will prepare a proposal for taking the project to its next phase.

Understanding Nepal's Insurgency

The South Asia Program of the SSRC, in conjunction with the Asia Society and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, sponsored a symposium and panel discussion in New York and Washington to increase awareness and understanding of the current state of political affairs in Nepal. These public events were held at a crucial time for Nepal, which is struggling with a breakdown of democracy and severe economic hardship as it tries to deal with a long-standing Maoist insurgency that grows more powerful daily. The New York event, "Understanding Nepal's Insurgency: Strategies for Sustainable Peace and Democracy," held on June 16, brought together 14 experts from the UN system, international policy-making community, NGOs and the academy to discuss steps toward resolving the conflict in Nepal. Divided into three panels, the symposium focused on the humanitarian costs of the conflict, local and regional initiatives taken to address the conflict, and challenges and strategies for reconciliation and reconstruction.

The next day, a panel discussion was held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. The event was intended to build on the recommendations generated in the New York symposium and to discuss the policy implications of the insurgency for regional stability as well as for US-Nepal relations. The discussion was well attended with over one hundred people from government, human rights and NGO communities present. The panel included two scholars from Nepal, both of whom work closely with the South Asia Program: Kanak Mani Dixit, editor of *Himal-South Asia* and *Himal Khabar Patrika*, a leading Nepali daily, and Deepak Thapa, editor, translator and writer for the Social Science Baha, a research center and library in Katmandu. Joining them were Jeffrey Key of Sweet Briar College and former US ambassador to Nepal Julia Chang Bloch, who moderated the discussion. The event began with a presentation by current US ambassador to Nepal Michael E. Malinowski on the implications of the insurgency for US-Nepal relations.

Lisa Anderson Named Chair of SSRC Board of Directors

Lisa Anderson, dean of the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, has been named chair of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).

Anderson, the sixth dean to head Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, has been on the university's faculty since 1986, serving as chair of the political science department and director of its Middle East Institute. She is among the nation's top scholars of the Middle East and North Africa, specializing in state formation and regime change. She has written several books including *Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: Social Science and Public Policy in the Twenty-first Century* (Columbia University Press, 2003. See p. 45 of this issue.) In addition, she has testified before the Foreign Relations Committees of both the House and Senate, published commentary in *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Los Angeles Times*, and appeared as an expert on major television and radio networks.

Anderson earned a bachelor's degree at Sarah Lawrence College, a master's degree in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a PhD in political science from Columbia. She is on the Board of Directors of Human Rights Watch and the Middle East Studies Association, where she serves as President. She is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and of the editorial committee of *Comparative Politics*.

Cora B. Marrett Steps Down as Chair of SSRC Board of Directors

Effective June 10, 2003, Cora B. Marrett has stepped down as chair of the SSRC Board of Directors. This was Marrett's second term as chair and 2003 marked 30 years of service given to the Council. She will continue her relationship with the Council in an advisory capacity and by assisting deveopment efforts. Marrett has served on a number of committees at the Council, including the Committee for Problems and Policy, the Committee for Grants to Minority Scholars for Research on Racism and other Social Factors in Mental Health, and the Committee on Research on the 1980 Census. She is currently senior vice president for academic affairs of the University of Wisconsin System. Previously she was vice chancellor for academic affairs and provost of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, after spending 23 years at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where she held faculty appointments in sociology and Afro-American studies. From 1990-92, she directed the United Negro College Fund/ Andrew W. Mellon Programs. From 1992-96 she took leave from the University of Wisconsin to become assistant director at the National Science Foundation, where she created and was the first person to lead the Directorate of Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences. Dr. Marrett's research interests include gender issues in classrooms, and women in science and medicine.

New Staff

Jason McNichol joined the Council in August 2003 as a program officer focusing on new initiatives related to economy and society, governance, healthcare, and social transformations related to HIV/AIDS. Prior to coming to the Council, McNichol coordinated several international grant programs and served as director of an interdisciplinary research consultancy. He has also taught at the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Freiburg (Germany), and other campuses.

McNichol's interest in bringing innovative social science scholarship to bear on issues of pressing public concern began during his undergraduate training in development and environmental sociology at Cornell University, where he received his Bachelor of Science degree in 1992. After further study in Central America and additional coursework and research undertaken at the University of Wisconsin in 1994-5, Dr. McNichol continued his doctoral work in sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his PhD in 2002. While at Berkeley, he also served as program coordinator for an interdisciplinary MacArthur Foundation program on multilateralism housed at the Institute of International Studies. During the same period, McNichol co-founded ELM Research Associates, an international network dedicated to drawing upon the complementary strengths of social scientists working around the world to address public problems through the coordination of rigorous interdisciplinary research. At ELM, McNichol directed a variety of projects on behalf of think-tanks, foundations, and other organizations on topics ranging from international studies of civil-military relations and human rights to assessments of corporate social and environmental responsibility.

McNichol's current research examines the institutional mechanisms through which communities, governments, NGOs, and firms respond to major global environmental and health-related challenges to shape policy and governance outcomes within and across nations. Among other topics, his recent publications have focused on the politics of eco-labeling in the global economy and cross-Atlantic controversies over the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.

Jennifer Holdaway has recently joined the Council as a program officer for the International Migration Program. She is working with the recently-formed working group on gender and migration, and on several ongoing projects that explore the ways in which migration is transforming the religious landscape of the United States. She will also be developing a new project on education and migration. Holdaway has a BA in Chinese Studies from Oxford University and a PhD in Political Science from the Graduate School of the City University of New York. Before coming to New York in 1989, she lived in Taiwan and China for five years, working for the European Union, and as a journalist and translator. While in graduate school, she was project manager for the Second Generation in Metropolitan New York—the first large scale study of the economic, social, and political incorporation of second generation immigrants in the region. She is currently working with Mary Waters, Philip Kasinitz and John Mollenkopf on a book reporting the findings of that study. She is also an associate member of MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Transitions to Adulthood. In addition to international migration, her interests include Chinese politics and US-China relations. She has taught in the political science departments at Brooklyn College and at Barnard College.

Publications

BOMBS AND BANDWIDTH: THE EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY, edited by Robert Latham. New York: The New Press, 2003. 326 pp.



The Information Technology and International Cooperation Program is pleased to announce the publishing of *Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between Information Technology and Security*. The volume, edited by Program Director Robert Latham, assembles leading scholars in a range of disciplines to explore the new power structures emerging around IT, the nature of information technology (IT)-related threats, and the ethical and political implications arising from this complex and important field. The volume proceeds from the premise that, with the emergence of the Internet and new digital technologies, traditional concepts such as territorial boundaries, privacy, surveillance, vulnerability, and above all, security, need to be reconsidered. This book examines how IT has become central to the way governments, businesses, social movements and even terrorist and criminal organizations pursue their increasingly globalized objectives in the post-9/11 era. *Bombs and Bandwidth* is the third volume in the SSRC/New Press series, "After September 11," which includes *Understanding September 11*, *Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from Around the World*, and forthcoming, *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After September 11*, and *Lessons of Empire*, all edited by SSRC staff and carrying contributions from dozens of scholars in SSRC international networks.

MONUMENTOS, MEMORIALS Y MARCAS TERRITORIALES, edited by Elizabeth Jelin and Victoria Langland. Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 2003. 219 pp.



The Program on Latin America is pleased to announce that the fifth volume resulting from the Council's project on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru has been published in Spanish by Siglo XXI Editores: *Monumentos, memoriales y marcas territoriales*, edited by Elizabeth Jelin and Victoria Langland. This multi-volume series consists of work produced by program fellows and faculty and has been released simultaneously in Madrid and Buenos Aires and distributed throughout the world.

This book explores the spatial/territorial dimensions of contemporary struggles over memory in the Southern Cone, looking at the processes by which diverse social actors in the region utilize physical spaces to commemorate and give meaning to the political repression and state terror of the recent past. As the essays collected in this volume poignantly demonstrate, the construction of monuments, memorials and other territorial inscriptions are conflictive processes that offer a privileged window for understanding the deep and sometimes irreconcilable social and political divisions left in the wake of state terror, as well as the multiple strategies of social actors to imbue public spaces with historical meaning.

In addition to the five volumes already published, up to seven additional volumes will be published with Siglo XXI in 2003-2004. The University of Minnesota Press has recently published an English language version of the first volume, *Labors of Memory*. (See next *Items & Issues*.)

Elizabeth Jelin is a sociologist, professor at the University of Buenos Aires, and the academic director of the Collective Memory and Repression Program sponsored by the SSRC. She also works with CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas), directs research for IDES (Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social) in Buenos Aires and serves on the Board of Directors and Latin America Regional Advisory Panel for the SSRC.

Victoria Langland is finishing her doctorate in Latin American History at Yale University. Her thesis, *Hablando de flores: Movimientos estuidantiles y memorias colectivas en el Brasil autoritario, 1964-1985*, analyzes the history of student movements in Brazil, particularly the struggles after 1968 to reorganize and put an end to the military regime.

JAMÁS TAN CERCA ARREMETIÓ LO LEJOS: MEMORIA Y VIOLENCIA POLÍTICA EN EL PERÚ, edited by Carlos Iván Degregori. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos Ediciones, 2003. 222 pp.



This volume is another product of the Council's program on Collective Memory of Repression, organized by the Latin America and Caribbean Program. Roughly translated, the title is "Never Had the Faraway Hit So Close to Home: Memory and Political Violence in Peru."

In Peru, as well as in other parts of the world that suffer the consequences of periods of political violence, the debates around what took place in the past are a crucial factor in the process of democratic construction and, on a more fundamental level, in the process of (re)construction of individual and collective identities. The essays that make up the present volume explore some of those "memory battles" about places, people and civil society institutions that acquired an emblematic character during Peru's recent years of political violence: the tragic death of eight journalists in the peasant community of Uchuraccay in Ayacucho; the murder of nine students of the University of Education "La Cantuta" in Lima; the struggle of the Ashaninka people in the Peruvian Amazon, an indigenous group decimated by the Maoist Shining Path group and the Armed Forces; and the search for justice by the National Association of Families of the Disappeared of Peru (ANFASEP). For information on how to acquire this volume and others from a series on Collective Memory of Repression published by Siglo XXI Editores in cooperation with the Council, please contact Latin America Program staff.

Carlos Iván Degregori is an anthropologist, researcher for the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, and professor at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. He is also a member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, as well as the Latin America Regional Advisory Panel for the SSRC.

CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA: NATION AND BELONGING IN THE HINTERLANDS, edited by Renato Rosaldo. Sponsored by the SSRC/ACLS joint committee on Southeast Asia. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003. 228 pp.



Nation building and the construction of citizenship, so often conducted—or coerced—from the center, are all too commonly studied from the center as well. This book moves the view of cultural citizenship to the periphery—specifically to the perspective of hinterland groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia—to show that notions of nationhood and citizenship are not given, but created, through dialogue between local communities and the state.

Written by an emergent generation of anthropologists and sponsored by the Joint Committee on Southeast Asia of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, these essays address the question of how the identities of peoples whose lives are "marginal" to the modern nation-state have been shaped, nonetheless, by the impingement of the nation-state on their worlds. Examining the interactions between Southeast Asian ethnic minorities and the political centers of power that attempt to draw these minorities into the nation-building process, the authors focus in particular on the concept of citizenship, both political and cultural: How do minority groups living on the peripheries of the nation define their own identities and their relationship to the center? How does the state regard their status and their claims as citizens of the nation?

Renato Rosaldo is Lucie Stern Professor in the Social Sciences and Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University. He is the author of *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (1989) and *Ilongot Headhunting, 1883-1974: A Study in Society and History* (1980).

ARCHITECTURES OF RUSSIAN IDENTITY: 1500 TO THE PRESENT, edited by James Cracraft and Daniel Rowland. Sponsored by the SSRC/ACLS Joint Committee on the Soviet Union and Successor States and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 253 pp.

From the royal pew of Ivan the Terrible, to Catherine the Great's use of landscape, to the struggles between the Orthodox Church and preservationists in post-Soviet Yaroslavl—across five centuries of Russian history, Russian leaders have used architecture to project unity, identity, and power. Church architecture has inspired national cohesion and justified political control while representing the claims of religion in brick, wood, and stone. The architectural vocabulary of the Soviet states celebrate industrialization, mechanization, and communal life. Buildings and landscapes have expressed utopian urges as well as lofty spiritual goals. Country houses and memorials have encoded their own messages. In this book the editors gather a group of authors from a wide variety of backgrounds—including history and architectural history, linguistics, literary studies, geography, and political science—to survey the political and symbolic meanings of many different kinds of structures.

James Cracraft is professor of history and University Scholar at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His books include *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture*. Daniel Rowland is director of the Gaines Center for the Humanities at the University of Kentucky and has published extensively on early modern Russian political culture.



PURSUING TRUTH, EXERCISING POWER: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, by Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 158 pp.

This book examines the tensions between the social sciences and the formation and implementation of public policy. How does, or should, the research of the academy affect policy today? Why are politicians often quick to dismiss professors as irrelevant, their undertakings purely "academic," while scholars often shrink from engagement as agents of social or political change? In tracing the ambivalence of social science toward public policy over the last century, Anderson argues that the disconnect between policy makers and social scientists is no longer sustainable at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Lisa Anderson is dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council. She has published widely on subjects related to state formation and regime change in the Middle East and North Africa.



Articles of the Transnational Migration Working Group of the International Migration Program have been published as a special issue of *International Migration Review* ("Transnational Migration: International Perspectives," eds. Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec, Vol. 37, Fall 2003). The issue presents topical and thematic assessments of the state of research regarding transnational aspects of migration. The publication grew out of two conferences held at Oxford and Princeton Universities in 2000 and 2001. These meetings brought together scholars from the US and Europe to address central conceptual and theoretical problems reflecting a recognition that some international migrants maintain strong, enduring ties to their homelands even as they incorporate into new countries of settlement. Such transnational ties call into question conventional assumptions about the direction and impacts of international migration and assimilation. The authors address general analytical challenges and review current knowledge about particular aspects of the economic, political, sociocultural, and religious activities of transnational migrants.

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